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THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTORt
Mark A. Lemley*
The theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve
problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if
properly incented. But the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is
largely a myth. Surveys of hundreds of significant new technologies show
that almost all of them are invented simultaneously or nearly simultaneous-
ly by two or more teams working independently of each other. Invention
appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, phenomenon.
The result is a real problem for classic theories of patent law. Our domi-
nant theory of patent law doesn't seem to explain the way we actually
implement that law.
Maybe the problem is not with our current patent law, but with our current
patent theory. But the dominant alternative theories of patent law don't do
much better Prospect theory--under which we give a patent early to one
company so it can control research and development-makes little sense in
a world in which ideas are in the air and are likely to be happened upon by
numerous inventors at about the same time. And commercialization theory,
which hypothesizes that we grant patents in order to encourage not inven-
tion but product development, seems to founder on a related historical fact:
most first inventors turn out to be lousy commercializers who end up delay-
ing implementation of the invention by exercising their rights.
If patent law in its current form can be saved, we need an alternative justi-
fication for granting patents in circumstances of near-simultaneous
invention. I offer another possibility: patent rights encourage patent races,
and that might actually be a good thing. Patent racing cannot alone justify
a patent system, but it may do more than any existing theory to explain how
patents work in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Any elementary school student can recite a number of canonical Ameri-
can invention stories. Thomas Edison invented the lightbulb from his
famous home laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. Alexander Graham
Bell invented the telephone, again from his home invention laboratory, and
famously used the phone to call his assistant, saying "Come here, Watson, I
need you." Orville and Wilbur Wright invented the airplane from their bicy-
cle shop, taking it to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina to put it in the air. The list
of lone genius inventors goes on and on: Samuel Morse and his telegraph,
Eli Whitney and his cotton gin, Robert Fulton and his steamboat, Philo
Farnsworth and the television, and so on.
Patent law is built around these canonical tales. First written in 1790, in
the first year of Congress, the patent law betrays its individual-inventor bias
at various points, from the requirement that patents always issue to individ-
uals rather than to companies to the traditional rule that the first to invent,
not the first to file, is entitled to the patent.' More importantly, the very theo-
ry of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems
that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly
incented by the lure of a patent. We deny patents on inventions that are "ob-
vious" to ordinarily innovative scientists in the field. Our goal is to
encourage extraordinary inventions-those that we wouldn't expect to get
without the incentive of a patent.
The canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a myth. Edison
didn't invent the lightbulb; he found a bamboo fiber that worked better as a
filament in the lightbulb developed by Sawyer and Man, who in turn built
on lighting work done by others. Bell filed for his telephone patent on the
very same day as an independent inventor, Elisha Gray; the case ultimately
went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which filled an entire volume of the United
States Reports resolving the question of whether Bell could have a patent
1. Chris Cotropia identifies the individual-inventor motif as a driving force in the
original patent system, albeit one that is mostly given lip service today. See Christopher A.
Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH.
52 (2009).
The first-to-invent regime is on its way out as a result of the passage of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act in 2011. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in scatttered sections of 35 U.S.C.). But it remains the
law for any patent application filed before March 16, 2013.
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despite the fact that he hadn't actually gotten the invention to work at the
time he filed. The Wright Brothers were the first to fly at Kitty Hawk as a
result of an improvement they made to a basic wing structure designed by
others, but their plane didn't work very well. It was quickly surpassed by
aircraft built by Glenn Curtiss and others-planes that the Wrights delayed
by over a decade with patent lawsuits. And on and on.
The point can be made more generally: surveys of hundreds of signifi-
cant new technologies show that almost all of them are invented
simultaneously or nearly simultaneously by two or more teams working
independently of each other. Invention appears in significant part to be a
social, not an individual, phenomenon. Inventors build on the work of those
who came before, and new ideas are often either "in the air" or result from
changes in market demand or the availability of new or cheaper starting ma-
terials. And in the few circumstances where that is not true-where
inventions truly are "singletons"-it is often because of an accident or error
in the experiment rather than a conscious effort to invent.2
This result is a real problem for classic theories of patent law. If we are
supposed to be encouraging only inventions that others in the field couldn't
have made, we should be paying much more attention than we currently do
to simultaneous invention. We should be issuing very few patents-surely
not the 200,000 per year that we do today.3 And we should be denying pa-
tents on the vast majority of the most important inventions, since most of
those seem to involve near-simultaneous invention. Put simply, our domi-
nant theory of patent law doesn't seem to explain the way we actually
implement that law.
Maybe the problem is not with our current patent law but with our cur-
rent patent theory. But the dominant alternative theories of patent law don't
do much better. Prospect theory-under which we give patents early to one
company so it can control research and development-makes little sense in
a world in which ideas are in the air and are likely to be happened upon by
numerous inventors at about the same time. Commercialization theory,
which hypothesizes that we grant patents in order to encourage not inven-
tion but product development, seems to founder on a related historical fact:
most first inventors turn out to be lousy commercializers who end up delay-
ing implementation of the invention by exercising their rights. And
disclosure theory, which justifies the grant of patents on the assumption that
scientists read and learn from them, fails to grapple with the way learning
occurs in the real world.
If patent theory is to align with real-world experience, we need an
alternative justification for granting patents in circumstances of near-
simultaneous invention. In Part III, this Article offers another possibility.
2. See STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY
OF INNOVATION 131-39 (2010).
3. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO" or "patent office") issued 219,614
patents in 2010. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last mod-
ified Sept. 7, 2011).
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Patent rights encourage patent races. While patent races are usually
derided as wasteful, there is reason to think that they might actually be a
good thing. Invention might be motivated, or at least hastened, not merely
by the hope of reward but by the fear of losing a race to a competitor who
in turn obtains a dominant patent. This new "patent racing" theory turns
the traditional incentive story on its head, ironically granting strong
exclusive rights in order to promote competition, not monopoly.
There is support for the patent racing idea in the history of major inven-
tions, but it is far from uniform. And patent racing theory does not fully
justify patent law in its current form. As a result, I offer some suggestions
for reforming patent law to take account of patent races given the prevalence
of simultaneous invention. But more research needs to be done before we
are confident enough in the broad application of this theory to change patent
law to conform to it. The result is, admittedly, somewhat unsatisfying. The
evidence suggests that our primary theories of innovation don't support pa-
tent law in its current form, but there is not yet enough evidence to suggest a
theory to replace it. This doesn't mean we should jettison the patent system;
there is evidence that it has served the country well. But it may well mean
we need to rethink the stories we tell ourselves about why we patent.
Part I discusses the remarkable prevalence of simultaneous invention
throughout history. Part II examines the problems this fact creates for each
of the dominant theories of patent law. Part III considers whether patent law
can be salvaged, and if so, how.
I. THE OVERWHELMING PREVALENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS INVENTION
While patent law is based on the belief that important inventions are ex-
ceptional-that is, not obvious to most people in the field-the history of
major inventions doesn't bear out that belief. The overwhelming majority of
inventions, including the overwhelming majority of so-called "pioneering"
inventions, are in fact developed by individuals or groups working inde-
pendently at roughly the same time.
A. Studies of Simultaneous Invention
Multiple, independent studies4 show that what Merton calls "singletons"
are extraordinarily rare sorts of inventions.5 Indeed, Lamb and Easton call
multiple, simultaneous invention "the pattern of scientific progress."'6 Mer-
ton's classic work suggests that inventions occur not merely because an
individual did something particularly creative or surprising, but because the
time and conditions were right.7 There are two components to this idea.
4. Because how ironic would it be if one and only one academic had come up with
the idea that ideas are rarely developed by one and only one person?
5. Robert K. Merton, Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in
the Sociology of Science, 105 PRoc. AM. PHIL. Soc'Y 470, 470 (1961).
6. D. LAMB & S.M. EASTON, MULTIPLE DISCOVERY (1984).
7. Merton, supra note 5, at 473.
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First, invention is not a discontinuity, but an incremental step in an ongoing
process. Inventors work with the tools they are given and try to improve
those tools or use them to make something new. Schoenmakers and
Duysters studied 157 different inventions and conclude that they are largely
based on extensions of existing knowledge.8
Second, invention by one and only one person or group is exceedingly
rare. Far more common are different groups that struggle with the same
incremental problem and achieve the same solution at roughly the same
time. Ogburn and Thomas conducted the classic study. They document
148 instances of simultaneous invention. Only rarely, they find, does an
inventor come up with an idea that is not developed in similar form by
others working independently.9
One might fault these studies for focusing on at least moderately well-
known inventions. Perhaps many people aim at large targets, but smaller
inventions have one and only one inventor.10 This would be a curious inver-
sion of classical patent theories, which have always given more attention to
protecting significant advances than to protecting minor ones. In any event,
what evidence there is suggests that simultaneous invention is a characteris-
tic of small inventions as well. Empirical evidence suggests that between 90
and 98 percent of modem patent lawsuits are filed against independent in-
ventors, not copiers. 11 A significant fraction of patents are invalidated
because someone else came up with the same idea before, often at roughly
the same time.12 For inventions worth the trouble of patenting and enforcing
in court, then-the very inventions the patent system might be thought to
encourage-simultaneous invention seems to be the norm.
The author of the leading patent treatise of the nineteenth century,
William Robinson, recognized this fact:
It is no answer ... to say that the privileged inventor is generally the sole
inventor, and that but for him the idea and its application would remain un-
known. The contrary is true. With very few exceptions, every invention is
the result of the inventive genius of the age, working under the demand of
its immediate wants, rather than the product of the individual mind. 3
8. Wilfred Schoenmakers & Geert Duysters, The Technological Origins of Radical
Inventions, 39 RES. POL'Y 1051 (2010).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO CUL-
TURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE 90-122 (1922); William F. Ogburn & Dorothy Thomas, Are
Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social Evolution, 37 POt. SCL Q. 83 (1922). For a more
skeptical reading of the history, see Augustine Brannigan & Richard A. Wanner, Paper, His-
torical Distributions of Multiple Discoveries and Theories of Scientific Change, 13 Soc.
STUD. ScI. 417, 420 (1983).
10. Ted Sichelman suggested this possibility to me.
11. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009).
12. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998).
13. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 29
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890).
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Justice Frankfurter noted that "the history of thought records striking co-
incidental discoveries-showing that the new insight first declared to the
world by a particular individual was 'in the air' and ripe for discovery and
disclosure."14
There are various reasons for the prevalence of simultaneous invention.
First, many inventions arise in response to consumer demand. If, suddenly,
the world wants to participate in online social networks, many people will
seek to fill that need, and-absent some large technical barrier-they will
likely do so at roughly the same time.
Second, inventions also arise in response to sudden changes in binding
constraints on the supply side. If, for instance, batteries suddenly become
dramatically cheaper and longer lasting, a number of inventors may imple-
ment in portable devices ideas that previously required stationary units
plugged into a power outlet. The same phenomenon can work in reverse: a
sudden shortage or sharp increase in the price of one product can make the
development of alternatives feasible for the first time.
Third, invention is often an incremental process, not a series of discrete
ideas conceived in isolation. This fact is well recognized in the literature.'"
George Stigler argues that each major idea in economics has been preceded
by others that at least suggested it. 16 The incremental nature of innovation
means that inventions are more likely to occur simultaneously, because both
inventors are building incrementally on the work that came before. 7 An
isolated flash of genius could strike at any time, while the thirteenth step in
a multistage inventive process is likely to come after the twelfth. But it also
means that the first flash of an idea isn't necessarily the important one; the
value of an idea often comes only after various people have honed and re-
fined it in various ways. 18 Many of the examples we will see involve a series
of incremental steps; history has chosen to highlight the first person to make
14. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 62 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
15. All inventors have the fortune of standing on the shoulders of the proverbial giants
who preceded them. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
477 & n.28, 478 (1984) (noting, in the case of copyright, that each person builds on the work
of predecessors); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumu-
lative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (discussing how to divide
joint profit among innovators within the framework of patent law when one innovator's tech-
nology builds on another's). As Justice Story explained well over a century ago, "[I]n
literature, in science, and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things [that] are strictly
new and original throughout." Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 4436); cf JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY passim (1996) (arguing that society systematically
understates the extent to which creators borrow from preexisting works).
16. George J. Stigler, The Nature and Role of Originality in Scientific Progress, 22
ECONOMICA 293, 293-95 (1955).
17. See Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the
Scientist, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (2010) (noting that simultaneous invention is a "logical
next step" when knowledge accumulates within a field).
18. See Stigler, supra note 16, at 293-95.
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one significant step in the chain while ignoring the developments that pre-
cede and follow it.
Finally, the fact that inventions are based on certain immutable physical
principles means that they will only work in certain ways. Inventors work
not only within the constraints of physics and chemistry but also within the
constraints of what we know about those physical principles. Donald
Campbell compares simultaneous inventors to rats in a maze, each inde-
pendently discovering the same path because it is the path that is there to be
discovered. 19 Joel Mokyr has argued that the simultaneity of inventions re-
sults from broad access to a shared base of knowledge about the world, and
thus has gone hand in hand with the acceleration of technological pro-
gress. 20 When information about the world is scarce and closely guarded,
only a few people are in a position to invent.21 Inventions are corresponding-
ly rare, and so are simultaneous inventions. 22 But as access to the base of
human knowledge grows, so does the number of possible inventors and the
likelihood of simultaneous invention.
23
Prior empirical evidence, then, suggests that inventions rarely occur in
isolation. They are socially derived in significant respects. 24 They build
closely on what came before. And inventions are quite often made by multi-
ple actors at about the same time.
B. Pioneering Inventions
"But wait," you may object at this point, "that evidence is talking about
ordinary inventions. Surely the most important inventions-the truly pio-
neering ones-are the ones that other people couldn't have figured out."
In fact, the evidence does not simply show that most inventions result from
simultaneous independent invention. It also shows that the vast majority of the
19. Campbell observes,
[a] major empirical achievement of the sociology of science is the evidence of the ubiq-
uity of simultaneous invention. If many scientists are trying variations on the same
corpus of current scientific knowledge, and if their trials are being edited by the same
stable external reality, then the selected variants are apt to be similar, the same discov-
ery encountered independently by numerous workers. This process is no more
mysterious than that all of a set of blind rats, each starting with quite different patterns
of initial responses, learn the same maze pattern, under the maze's common editorship
of the varied response repertoires. Their learning is actually their independent invention
or discovery of the same response pattern.
Donald T. Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology, in I THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER
413, 435 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1974), reprinted in EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY, THE-
ORY OF RATIONALITY, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 47, 71 (Gerard Radnitzky &
W.W. Bartley, III eds., 1987).
20. JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 101 (2002).
21. See id. at 7-9.
22. Seeid. at 101.
23. See id.
24. For a discussion of the literature, see Landers, supra note 17, at 62-69.
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most important inventions of the past two centuries-the pioneering inven-
tions that seem with the passage of history such radical departures from the
prior art-were themselves the result of gradual social processes in which
multiple inventors developed the key parts of the invention at about the
same time.
25
It is worth investigating these stories in detail, not only because they
demonstrate that simultaneous invention and incremental improvement are
the way innovation works, even for radical inventions, but because the les-
sons of history offer some valuable insights into how well existing patent
theories jibe with the realities of innovation.
The steam engine. James Watt is famous to the world as the inventor of
the steam engine. 26 According to the common story, he patented his engine
and used that broad patent on the basic concept to control the development
of steam locomotion for decades, arguably delaying the development of that
technology by others.
27
In fact, Watt was not the first person to come up with the idea of the
steam engine. Indeed, some historians refer to a "general climate of interest
in the steam-engine which seems to have been reaching fever pitch in the
middle and later decades of the eighteenth century."2 Robinson and Musson
detail the work of the many other inventors in the field; one very similar
patent cited against Watt, in particular, leads Robinson and Musson to con-
clude that it "helps to substantiate the suggestion that others were
experimenting along similar lines to Watt, and independently of him."
29
25. Defining a "pioneering" invention is difficult. For purposes of this Article, I do not
need to work through those definitional difficulties. In general, I treat an invention as a pio-
neer if it creates a new market, opens new opportunities in a variety of existing markets, or
renders current technologies in an existing market obsolete. For discussions of the defini-
tional issues, see, for example, MOKYR, supra note 20 and DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN
ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1998).
Courts have a well-established doctrine of "pioneering inventions," and thus have con-
sidered these issues. Over a century ago the Supreme Court said that the "[m]ost conspicuous
examples of such [pioneering] patents are: [t]he one to Howe of the sewing machine; to
Morse of the electrical telegraph; and to Bell of the telephone." Westinghouse v. Boyden
Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 562 (1898).
For a discussion of the legal doctrine of pioneer inventors, see Brian J. Love, Interring
the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://
works.bepress.com/brian_love/3/; John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law
and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) ("Courts construe pioneer patent
claims.., to encompass a broader range of so-called 'equivalents' during an infringement
determination."); Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the
Pioneer Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375 (2001).
26. For general background on Watt, see ERIC ROBINSON & A.E. MUSSON, JAMES
WATT AND THE STEAM REVOLUTION (1969).
27. For discussion of this story, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 1-5 (2008), who use it as an illustration of what they see as the
problem with patents.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 9.
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What Watt and his coinventor Boulton in fact contributed was not the
concept of the steam engine but a particular implementation of that
engine-the separate condenser, an improvement on the preexisting New-
comen steam engine. Interestingly, the subsequent development of steam
engines was arguably driven by the Boulton-Watt patents, but not in the way
we normally expect patents to work. Instead, the lockup effected by Watt's
broad patent fights drove subsequent inventors to seek different approaches
to the steam engine. It was one of those different approaches, designed to
avoid the Boulton-Watt patents, that actually succeeded in making steam
engines practical.3"
Steamboats. Once the steam engine had been developed, application of
that engine to transportation of various forms became an obvious goal. To
apply the steam engine to water travel, inventors needed to use the power
generated by steam to push some form of oar through the water. The pre-
ferred solution to this problem was a rotating paddle wheel that the pressure
of steam pushed through the water.
The steamboat is a classic example of independent invention.3" While
the popular imagination acknowledges Robert Fulton as the inventor of the
steamboat, the historical evidence suggests that many different people de-
veloped steamboats at about the same time.32 Indeed, in the aftermath of the
Revolutionary War, when the Articles of Confederation left patent rights to
the states, different states issued patents to different inventors of the steam-
boat.33 The conflict between these inventors over patent rights issued by
different states was one of the driving forces behind assigning patent rights
to the federal government in the U.S. Constitution.
34
30. See George Selgin & John Turner, Strong Steam, Weak Patents, or the Myth of
Watt's Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2011) (man-
uscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589712 ("Watt's monopoly rights may
actually have hastened the development of the high-pressure steam engine, by causing at
least one of his rivals-Richard Trevithick-to revive a previously abandoned technology in
order to invent around Watt's monopoly.").
31. See James Mak & Gary M. Walton, Steamboats and the Great Productivity Surge
in River Transportation, 32 J. EcON. HIST. 619, 623-24 (1972).
32. JACK L. SHAGENA, WHO REALLY INVENTED THE STEAMBOAT? FULTON'S
CLERMONT Coup 113-390 (2004) (detailing the work of eight different inventors, including
Robert Fulton, but also William Henry, James Rumsey, John Fitch, Oliver Evans, Nathan
Read, Samuel Morey, and John Stevens).
33. For discussion of these conflicts, see Michael F Martin, The End of the First-to-
Invent Rule: A Concise History of Its Origin, 49 IDEA 435, 451-53 (2009); Frank D. Prager,
The Steam Boat Interference 1787-1793, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 611,613-15 (1958); Edward
C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a "First-to-
Invent" Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 270 (1995).
34. E.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL AGE 125-26 (5th ed. 2010) (identifying the conflict between the states over the




Fulton is remembered as the inventor of the steamboat primarily because
he was successful in writing a broad patent to cover it, albeit one patented
decades after other claimants.35
The cotton gin. Eli Whitney is the first famous U.S. inventor. According
to the common story, his cotton gin was a dramatic departure from old
hand-driven cotton separating and a quantum leap ahead of its competitors,
and it represented the first step in the mechanization of farming.36 Whitney
patented his cotton gin, but had a hard time enforcing the patent against
numerous copies that sprang up."
The reality is a bit more complicated. Gins of some forms (mostly in
roller form) had been around for thousands of years in Africa, the Middle
East, India, and China; some of these were pedaled models, others hand-
operated.38 The Indian roller-type gin made it to the Americas and Caribbe-
an by roughly 1750. Hand-cranked and hand-and-foot gins were in use in
the Americas during this period; eventually, foot gins came to dominate the
Americas pre-Whitney. Lakwete speculates they may have been developed
indigenously, or alternatively could have come from China.
39
Mechanical cotton gins were also well known by Whitney's time. In
1788, Joseph Eve developed an inanimately powered, self-feeding roller gin
that promised to diminish the number of accidents, which were a significant
risk with gins. By at least 1803, flywheels, which appear to have developed
out of spinning technology, were adapted to the roller gin models.
40
Whitney's idea was thus not the cotton gin, or even the mechanical cot-
ton gin. Rather, his idea was to improve existing cotton gins by replacing
rollers with coarse wire teeth that rotated through slits to pull the fiber from
the seed. Lakwete suggests that this was really quite "unprecedented," and a
demonstrable departure from the basic roller model that had dominated all
models for thousands of years. 4' But even this may overstate Whitney's con-
tribution, because other mechanics were using toothed gins before
Whitney's invention and had even patented such gins. Miller, in early corre-
spondence with Whitney (May-June 1793), warned of two other
35. William Woodward goes so far as to suggest that "Fulton might more properly be
credited with the invention of the [patent] 'claim' than of the steamboat." William Redin
Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 758
(1948).
36. The classic story is well recounted in DENISON OLMSTED, MEMOIR OF ELI WHIT-
NEY, ESQ. (Arno Press 1972) (1846).
37. His frustration with patent litigation was so great that at one point he wrote to his
friend Josiah Stebbins, "I have a set of the most Depraved villains to combat and I might
almost as well go to hell in search of happiness as apply to a Georgia Court for Justice."
Mary Bellis, Eli Whitney and the Cotton Gin: Eli Whitney's Patent Battle, ABOUT.cOm, http://
inventors.about.com/cs/inventorsalphabet/a/eli-whitney-5.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
38. ANGELA LAKWETE, INVENTING THE COTTON GIN: MACHINE AND MYTH IN ANTE-
BELLUM AMERICA 1-20 (2003).
39. Id. at27-31.
40. Id. at 37-45.
41. Id. at 46-48.
[Vol. 110:709
The Myth of the Sole Inventor
anonymous inventors' advances and urged him to make progress. In January
1794, "a ginnery manager hinted to Miller that Augusta mechanics were
making toothed gins and that merchant ginners and planters were buying
and using them. '42 John Barcley developed a gin in 1795, which specified
"setts or circles of teeth" (e.g., saws), suggesting that Whitney was not the
only one to whom the idea of a toothed gin occurred.
4 3
Whitney's gin worked well, and that's worth something. But it seems
that other people were developing similar ideas at around the same time.
The telegraph. Samuel Morse is well known as the inventor of the tele-
graph, the first realistic means of communicating information at a distance
(and in many respects the internet of its day). According to the traditional
story, Morse had an "aha" moment at a dinner with a geologist, Professor
Jackson. Morse stated, "We were conversing on the recent scientific discov-
eries in electro magnetism and the experiments in Ampere."' Another guest
asked Jackson whether an electrical signal fades over distance and Morse's
dinner mate said that it did not and that Benjamin Franklin had shown that it
travels instantly across wire. This prompted Morse to think that "intelli-
gence" might be "transmitted instantaneously by electricity."45 Morse is
perhaps most famous for "Morse code," the sets of long and short electrical
signals that represent letters and numbers and enabled communication.
Morse did in fact develop a working telegraph. But he was not the first
to do so. There was significant interest in developing the telegraph in Eu-
rope, independent of Morse 6.4 The telegraph was developed at about the
same time by a number of others, including Charles Wheatstone and Sir
William Fothergill Cooke, Edward Davy, and Carl August von Steinheil
47
Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that Morse, Steinheil, Wheatstone, and
Davy all invented "so nearly simultaneousl1y], that neither inventor can be
justly accused of having derived any aid from the discoveries of the other."
48
Morse's "idea" already existed in the world; the difficulty was in making
it work over substantial distances. The key to Morse's new implementation
was the development of efficient electromagnets that could sustain and
boost electrical signals over wire. And it is Joseph Henry, not Morse, who
made the original discovery of coiling wire to strengthen electromagnetic
induction and apparently produced the first embodiment of the telegraph.49
42. Id. at 59-60.
43. Id. at 58-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. KENNETH SILVERMAN, LIGHTNING MAN: THE ACCURSED LIFE OF SAMUEL F.B.
MORSE 153-55 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151-52.
47. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 107-10 (1854). For a more detailed
history, see KEN BEAUCHAMP, HISTORY OF TELEGRAPHY 6-48 (2001).
48. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 108.




Morse was aware of and explicitly built on Henry's work.5" Morse's patent-
ed contribution was in fact the application of Henry's powerful
electromagnets to boost signal strength. And it is not even clear that he fully
understood how that contribution worked; his patent refers to the use of the
"galvanic" current without any recognition of the now well-understood
equivalence between electricity and magnetism.
5'
Others continued to improve on Morse's telegraph. Theodore Vail is
credited with the telegraph key and with improving Morse code. 2 His work
also led to interest in the communication of sound as well as data over elec-
trical wires, as explored below.
The sewing machine. Elias Howe, the inventor of the sewing machine,
was recognized by the Supreme Court as one of the three most pioneering
inventors of the nineteenth century.53 But Howe himself never manufactured
or sold sewing machines.5 4 I.M. Singer & Co. sold the first practical sewing
machine, which itself resulted from inventive work by Singer and a variety
of others, including John Bachelder, Charles Morey, and Joseph B. John-
son. Howe sued Singer for patent infringement, and the resulting litigation
continued for over a decade, concluding only when the parties agreed to
form a patent pool, the Sewing Machine Combination. And it turns out the
first inventor of the sewing machine may have been none of these individu-
als. Walter Hunt may have invented a sewing machine as early as 1834, ten
years before Howe.
56
The telephone. Alexander Graham Bell is, with Thomas Edison and the
Wright Brothers, the most iconic American inventor.5 7 In part this is because
Bell's telephone not only worked but grew to dominate the emerging tele-
phone industry with a company bearing his name.
Bell described his invention as an "Improvement[] in Telegraphy."58 The
improvement consisted of allowing the electrical signals already transmitted
over telegraph wires to be converted into sounds. But Bell was hardly the
only one working on that problem. It was a well-known target to which
many people applied themselves and made substantial progress; Bell built
50. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 47, at 52; SILVERMAN, supra note 44, at 159-60.
51. See Adam Mossoff, O'Reilly v. Morse: Reevaluating a Foundational Patent Case
in Historical Context (Working Paper 2010), available at http://169.229.248.216/files/bclt
_IPSC2010_Mossoff( 1 ).pdf.
52. SILVERMAN, supra note 44, at 235.
53. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 562 (1898).
54. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 193-94 (2011); Ryan L. Lampe &
Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sew-
ing Machine Industry 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,061, 2009),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/1506 .html.
55. Mossoff, supra note 54, at 177-79.
56. Id. at 187.
57. For a good general background, see ROBERT V. BRUCE, BELL: ALEXANDER GRA-
HAM BELL AND THE CONQUEST OF SOLITUDE (Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1973).
58. U.S. Patent No. 174,465 col. 1 11. 4-5 (filed Feb. 14, 1876).
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on that progress. Helmholtz developed a receiver apparatus that would con-
vert signals to sounds, which Alexander Ellis described to Bell. Indeed, Bell
testified that "[mly knowledge of Helmholtz's apparatus for the artificial
production of vowel sounds incited me to experiments of a similar charac-
ter."5
9
A receiver needed to be coupled with a transmitter that converted
sounds into electrical signals. Bell did in fact describe a transmitter in his
patent. But it turns out he was not the first to do so. Johann Philipp Reis
publicly demonstrated a transmitter in 1861,60 before either Bell or Elisha
Gray and apparently without their knowledge.
Bell's real contribution to this preexisting technology seems to have
been in the decision to vary the strength of the current to capture variations
in voice and sound. But here too Bell did not work alone. Thomas Edison
was working on the same problem and also tinkered with variations in the
strength of the current, though he ultimately took a different approach than
Bell.
6 1
Bell's ultimate invention put together a transmitter, a fluctuating
current, and a receiver. But so did others. Elisha Gray filed an application
in the patent office on the same day as Bell, following on other Gray ap-
plications that predated Bell's, 6 and their inventions were ultimately put
into interference. 63 The resulting case went to the Supreme Court, and the
Court's opinion takes up an entire volume of the United States Reports.
Despite the fact that Gray's independent invention was different and in
some ways better than Bell's, 64 and despite the fact that Bell actually got
his invention to work only in March 1876, well after his filing date,65 Bell
won the case. The Court ruled for Bell despite the breadth of his patent
59. THE BELL TELEPHONE: THE DEPOSITION OF ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL IN THE
SUIT BROUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES To ANNUL THE BELL PATENTS 12 (Am. Bell Tel.
Co. 1908). For a general discussion regarding competing claims to the development of the
telephone, see MICHAEL E. GORMAN, TRANSFORMING NATURE: ETHICS, INVENTION AND
DISCOVERY §§ 3.2.1-3.5 (1998).
60. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 66 (1888).
61. BRUCE, supra note 57, at 92-93; PAUL ISRAEL, EDISON: A LIFE OF INVENTION 131
(1998).
62. See BRUCE, supra note 57, at 130-38.
63. David A. Hounshell, Bell and Gray: Contrasts in Style, Politics, and Etiquette, 64
PRoC. IEEE 1305, 1311-14 (1976) [hereinafter Hounshell, Bell and Gray]; David A.
Hounshell, Two Paths to the Telephone, ScI. AM., Jan. 1981, at 157, 157, 162-63 [hereinafter
Hounshell, Two Paths].
In fact, Gray's filing was a "caveat" rather than a full patent application. Hounshell, Bell
and Gray, supra, at 1311. A caveat was a mechanism by which an inventor working in a field
could receive notice if anyone else filed a patent on the same technology, so that the parties
could litigate the question of who was first. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 12, 5 Stat. 117
(1836) (amended 1870).
64. For instance, Gray's receiver worked better than the one Bell actually designed.
See Hounshell, Bell and Gray, supra note 63, at 1308-13.
65. Compare U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876) (issued Mar. 7, 1876), with
BRUCE, supra note 57, at 179-8 1.
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claim, which covered any device "for transmitting vocal or other sounds...
by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air
accompanying the said vocal or other sounds. '66 And in dissent, Justice
Bradley, writing for three of the seven Justices, called the claim of yet an-
other inventor, Daniel Drawbaugh, for priority over Bell "overwhelming." 67
Bell invented a telephone, but he surely didn't do it from scratch, and he
didn't invent the only one. Bell's iconic status owes as much to his victories
in court and in the marketplace as to his work at the lab bench.
The lightbulb. If Alexander Graham Bell is known to the world as the
inventor of the telephone, Thomas Alva Edison has equally iconic status as
the inventor of the lightbulb. Edison was a prolific inventor who branched
out from his early work in telegraphy to a bewildering array of inventions,
and he is rightly recognized as the first person to take invention from a hob-
by to a business.
68
It seems clear, however, that Edison did not "invent" the lightbulb in any
meaningful sense. Electric lighting had a long history by the time
Edison entered the field, starting with the arc lighting work of Sir Humphrey
Davy.69 Even incandescent lightbulbs-glass vacuum tubes through which a
poor conductor of electricity was looped, giving off heat and light as an elec-
tric current was passed through it-were known before Edison entered the
field. Sawyer and Man patented the incandescent lightbulb; indeed, when
Edison built his improved incandescent lightbulb, Sawyer and Man sued for
patent infringement. 70 They weren't the only ones; Joseph Swan owned the
patent rights in England, and his enforcement of that patent persuaded
Edison to merge his operations with Swan's rather than risk a suit.71 All in
all, as the Supreme Court noted, "[a] large number of persons, in various
countries" were working on incandescent lighting in the 1870s.72
Edison's particular inventive contribution was the discovery of a new
filament-a particular species of bamboo-that worked better than Sawyer
66. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 531, 572 (1888). For an excellent history of this
litigation, see Christopher Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone? Lawyers, Patents, and
the Judgments of History, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 854 (2010).
67. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 573 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
68. See ISRAEL, supra note 61, at 119-20; ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON AND THE Busi-
NESS OF INNOVATION 19 (1990) ("Edison's invention factories were the pioneers of industrial
research...."); WORKING AT INVENTING: THOMAS A. EDISON AND THE MENLO PARK EXPE-
RIENCE (William S. Pretzer ed., 1989).
69. For a discussion of the chronology of electric lighting up to the time of Edison, see
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 269 (4th ed. 2007).
70. See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). Sawyer and Man lost the
suit because their patent claim was overbroad; while they had used a high-resistance filament
made of carbonized paper to generate light, the Court held their claim to all filaments of
vegetable and fibrous material overbroad, in part because they did not recognize the im-
portance of high resistance.
71. KENNETH R. SWAN, SIR JOSEPH SWAN AND THE INVENTION OF THE INCANDES-
CENT ELECTRIC LAMP 21-25 (1946).
72. Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. at 47 1.
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and Man's carbonized paper because it had a higher resistance to electricity
and so turned more of the power routed through the bulb into light. Higher
resistance was a useful contribution, though it is worth noting that Edison's
core patent, U.S. Patent No. 223,898, was filed in a rush to beat known
competitors to market and included elements like a spiral filament that he
himself soon abandoned.
Edison found commercial success with his bamboo filament, which last-
ed much longer than other carbonized vegetable materials. But bamboo
didn't turn out to be the future; subsequent inventors came up with still bet-
ter filaments in short order,7 3 and modem incandescent lightbulbs operate on
the high-resistance filament principle and use filaments that none of the in-
ventors would have thought possible or feasible.
What Edison really did well was commercialize the invention. His light-
bulbs worked better than Sawyer and Man's, not only because he used a
better filament but also because he was better at manufacturing them, creat-
ing a vacuum seal that significantly extended the life of a lightbulb and
made it a commercial success. And like Bell, he succeeded in the market-
place. There is no doubt that Edison added value. But his contribution to the
development of the lightbulb was an incremental one in a long chain of im-
provements.
The movie projector. While Edison is best known for the lightbulb, he is
also known to the world as the inventor of the movie projector. Edison did
indeed make a movie projector of sorts, but not the kind we think of today
as a movie projector. Edison took his electric light and shined it through a
magnifying lens and a strip of cellulose nitrate film that George Eastman
had developed for cameras.74 The resulting "Kinetoscope" ran a strip of film
with successive images nonstop through the projection device. The audience
could see motion, but it was all a blur. Francis Jenkins, later known as a key
pioneer in television, built his own kinetoscope, but with an important dif-
ference: he modified it to project each image for a specified period of time
(the current standard is 1/24 of a second), rather than to run the images con-
tinuously. The result was that the eye saw a series of static pictures that it
interpreted as motion. It was Jenkins's 1895 "Projecting Phantoscope," not
Edison's earlier kinetoscope, that became the basis of the motion picture
industry.
7 5
Why, then, don't we know Jenkins as the inventor of the movie projec-
tor? The answer is that his financial backer stole the prototype from his
house and sold it to a theater chain, which marketed it as the "Edison Vita-
scope" since Edison was a famous inventor by that time. Jenkins sued and
73. By 1903, Willis Whitnew bad developed a metal-coated carbon filament that did
not turn the inside of the lamp black. G. Zissis & S. Kitsinelis, State of Art on the Science
and Technology of Electrical Light Sources: From the Past to the Future, 42 J. PHYSICS D:
APPLIED PHYSICS 173001, at 3 tbl.1 (2009). Zissis and Kitsinelis also include a chronology
of lighting-related inventions that predate Edison's. Id.
74. DAVID E. FISHER & MARSHALL JON FISHER, TUBE: THE INVENTION OF TELEVISION
40 (1996).
75. Id. at 40-41.
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eventually recovered some money from the theft, but the invention was
known to the public ever after as Edison's.76
The automobile. Think of the invention of the automobile, and it is hard
to avoid thinking of Henry Ford. His mass-production model turned auto-
mobiles from individual, hand-crafted devices into mass-market products
that we still recognize even today, such as the Model A and the Model T.
But Ford did not invent the automobile. Cars developed out of a combi-
nation of bicycles and tricycles, which involved wheels and a geared
mechanism, and previous engines for propulsion such as steam engines and
locomotives. The bicycle industry flourished briefly before the rise of cars,
and the expertise gained in that industry informed automobile manufactur-
ing.77 For example, the Dodge Brothers manufactured bicycles before
getting involved with Ransom Olds; similarly, Carl Benz adapted a tricycle
design. 8 Bicycles also helped build technologies such as pneumatic tires,
and infrastructure such as the growth of well-paved roads also smoothed the
transition to cars.
The original development of the automobile was largely European. Carl
Benz drove the first vehicle with an internal combustion engine in 1885,
Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach built the first four-wheel car with a
four-stroke engine, Niklaus Otto developed the engine that Ford later
claimed his design was based on, and other Europeans such as Peugot and
Renault also developed early automobiles.7 9
Even in the United States, Ford was only one of many early automobile
entrepreneurs. According to Raff and Trajtenberg, there were over 150 car
companies by the second decade of the twentieth century.80 Buick founded
his company in 1903. Ransom Olds began production in 1901. Henry Le-
land, a machinist, built engines for Ransom Olds before Ford and formed
Cadillac a year later. William Durant formed GM in 1908 and eventually
began acquiring others among the hundreds of car entrepreneurs. Ford was
well aware of these figures through the scientific journals he read.8'
The person who made the biggest effort to patent the automobile was
none of these inventors. George Selden, a patent lawyer, was granted a
broad patent on a combined gasoline engine with a carriage in 1895, having
delayed his own patent for years in the PTO. Selden enforced that patent
against others in the industry who used internal combustion engines, includ-
76. Id. at41.
77. MOWERY & ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 50-52.
78. ALLAN NEVINS WITH FRANK ERNEST HILL, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE
COMPANY 126-27, 189 (1954).
79. For a discussion of these precursors, see id. at 92-118.
80. Daniel M.G. Raff & Manuel Trajtenberg, Quality-Adjusted Prices for the Ameri-
can Automobile Industry: 1906-1940, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 71, 75 tbl.2.1
(Timothy F Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon eds., 1996); see also NEVINS WITH HILL, supra
note 78, at 92-118.
81. RICHARD BAK, HENRY AND EDSEL: THE CREATION OF THE FORD EMPIRE 19-22
(2003).
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ing Ford, until he ultimately lost on appeal in 1911.82 Notably, the appellate
court rejected Selden's infringement claims because it found that prior art
developed by still others, notably Brayton, predated Selden and precluded a
broad construction of the patent. 3
Nor was Ford the first American to successfully sell cars, and, according
to Bak and others, he didn't particularly care. He saw the opportunity for
improvement: his innovation was in the production process ("Fordism"),
which really amounts to an incremental technological improvement in man-
ufacturing, not in automotive technology.84 Ford successfully packaged the
automobile and helped to push us toward combustion and away from steam
or electric motive technologies. As a result, he is the person we most associ-
ate with the automobile. But he was not a pioneering inventor in the way
patent law understands the term. As Schmookler concludes, "[I]t seems al-
most obvious ... that the automobile came when it did more because of
economic and social changes than because of technological change as
such." 5
The airplane. Orville and Wilbur Wright, who ran a bicycle shop in
Ohio, are known to the world as the inventors of the airplane. And they were
indeed the first to fly a self-propelled heavier-than-air craft. But they did not
operate in a vacuum.
Several aviation experts argue that the development of the airplane is
best characterized as a series of insights and inventions and that it is unfair
to suggest that there is a single inventor.86 Inventive interest in the idea of
flying dates back at least to da Vinci. And by the time the Wright Brothers
invented, George Cayley had conceived of and described the basic fixed-
wing/fuselage/tail-fins design that would become the basis of the airplane
and had experimented with the design in gliders.87 Alphonse Penaud had
designed a tail that promoted stability.8 Otto Lilienthal had flown a series of
gliders.89 And Horatio Phillips developed widely adopted airfoiled wings
(the "airplane" that was to give the flying machine its name).90 By 1899,
Anderson writes, all these aspects of an airplane were "accepted as the
norm" even though no one had successfully flown one. 91
82. See JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 51-54 (1988).
83. Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 184 F 893, 901 (2d Cir. 1911).
84. BAK, supra note 81, at 73.
85. Jacob Schmookler, Changes in Industry and in the State of Knowledge as Deter-
minants of Industrial Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 195, 226 (1962).
86. See JOHN D. ANDERSON, JR., INVENTING FLIGHT: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS AND
THEIR PREDECESSORS 3, 153 (2004); TOM D. CROUCH, A DREAM OF WINGS: AMERICANS AND
THE AIRPLANE, 1875-1905, at 19 (1981) (positing that the invention of the airplane was
achieved due to a "foundation of a unique community of American technologists").
87. ANDERSON, supra note 86, at 25-27.
88. Id. at 92.
89. Id. at 66-73.




The Wrights were aware of all this work. Indeed, they wrote to the
Smithsonian in 1899 asking for all available information on the develop-
ment of flight, and obtained at least the work just described. 92 They also
consulted with an experienced aeronautics engineer, Octave Chanute, who
likely pushed them in productive directions.93 Orville himself said, "On
reading the different works on the subject we were much impressed with the
great number of people who had given thought to [mechanical flight],
among some of the greatest minds the world has produced."
94
The Wrights invented a particular improvement to flying machines, al-
beit a critical one: they came up with a way of warping a wing to control the
direction of flight while turning a rear rudder to counterbalance the effect of
bending the wing, maintaining the stability of the plane.95 The Wrights
solved the stability problem by having a single cable warp the wing and turn
the rudder at the same time. Their patent, however, was not so limited, and
they successfully asserted it against subsequent inventors such as Glenn
Curtiss. 96 Curtiss improved the design of the wing by using ailerons-
movable portions of the wing that had been developed years before by a
consortium that included Alexander Graham Bell. A frustrated Curtiss re-
portedly said that the Wright Brothers believed their patent was so broad
that anyone who jumped up and down and flapped their arms infringed it. 97
The Wrights successfully enforced their patent against all alternative air-
craft, including many that surpassed their technical achievement.98 It was
not until World War I that the patent suits were resolved, and it took the in-
tervention of the U.S. government to compel cross-licensing of various
patents so that the various companies could build planes for the war effort. 99
The Wrights, then, made a critical step that others did not, and they are just-
ly recognized for that. But the step they took was one incremental step in a
long series, and it was quickly surpassed by alternative technology devel-
oped by others.
92. Id. at 94-95.
93. Id. at 116-17.
94. Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 101 ("With the exception of wing warping for lateral control (uniquely their
development), [the Wrights] used existing technology.").
96. Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.) (L. Hand, J.) (holding the
Wrights' patent to be pioneering and so entitled to broad scope), rev'd, 180 F. 112 (2d Cir.
1910).
97. Frank Wicks, Trial by Flyer, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING MAGAZINE (2003),
http://www.memagazine.org/supparch/flight03/trialby/trialby.html.
98. See Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Patent Battles, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT
COMM'N, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/WrightBros/Patent_Battles/WR12.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2011).
99. George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agree-
ment, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 231-32 (1988); Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing
Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics,
CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at 8, 34 n.4.
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Radio. Guglielmo Marconi is known to the world as the inventor of the
radio. 1°° He thought of his invention as a wireless telegraph: that is, as an
improvement in telegraphy that would allow the same sorts of data commu-
nication-the dots and dashes of Morse code-even between two points
that were not connected with a telegraph wire. 01 Marconi himself drew on
prior work. Frost writes, "Marconi's first wireless telegraph-an invention
that wrought radical changes on the world if one ever did-borrowed liber-
ally from the decades-old practices of electrical engineering and overland
telegraphy."'0 2 Indeed, Boldrin and Levine document a number of other
simultaneous, independent inventors who developed wireless telegraphy or
were close to doing so between 1896 and 1898.103 Marconi's primary con-
tribution to the work of others appears to have been the use of an elevated
aerial-itself developed by Popovy°4 Beauchamp describes Marconi as "in
essence, a practical implementer of existing technology, rather than an inno-
vator, much as Morse had been with terrestrial telegraphy."'
0 5
Interestingly, Marconi originally viewed his invention as a niche im-
provement in telegraphy, primarily of use in allowing ships at sea to
communicate with each other.1 6 He did not see his invention as a medium
for one-to-many communication, the primary use that was made of the
technology for the next hundred years. That did not prevent him from claim-
ing broad patents covering radio, however. The Marconi Company sued the
United States for infringing its patents in 1916. The case lasted nearly thirty
years and went to the Supreme Court, which held that Marconi's patents
were invalid based on prior work by Nikola Tesla. 107
Whoever was in fact the first inventor, making radio practical took a
great deal of further work, on both the broadcast and receiving ends. Radio
receivers were developed independently by Edwin H. Armstrong and Lee de
Forest, who engaged in a legendary patent interference over rights to the
triode that was at the heart of the receiver (and of vacuum tubes used for
100. For general discussion, see HUGH G.J. AITKEN, THE CONTINUOUS WAVE (1985)
and W. RUPERT MACLAURIN & R. JOYCE HARMAN, INVENTIONS & INNOVATION IN THE RA-
DIO INDUSTRY (1949).
101. Indeed, Ken Beauchamp's book History of Telegraphy considers "terrestrial teleg-
raphy" and "aerial telegraphy" (i.e., radio), and devotes more time to the latter. See supra
note 47.
102. GARY L. FROST, EARLY FM RADIO: INCREMENTAL TECHNOLOGY IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 23 (2010).
103. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY ch.
8 at 23-25 (2008).
104. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 47, at 186.
105. Id.
106. News Release, Stanford University, Humans Not Great at Assessing New Technol-
ogy, Economist Says (June 1, 1994), available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/94/
940601Arc4231.html.
107. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 38 (1943). For a
discussion of the history, see, for example, Christopher A. Harkins, Tesla, Marconi, and the
Great Radio Controversy: Awarding Patent Damages Without Chilling a Defendant's Incen-
tive to Innovate, 73 Mo. L. REV. 745, 751-59 (2008).
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decades thereafter).0 8 Johnson points out that de Forest misunderstood his
own invention at every turn: "[A]t almost every step of the way, de Forest
was flat-out wrong about what he was inventing. The Audion was not so
much an invention as it was the steady, persistent accumulation of error."'"
Receivers were the subject of hundreds of overlapping patents in the
first two decades of the twentieth century, and those patents led to debilitat-
ing litigation that immobilized the industry until the 1920s, when the largest
patent owners formed a patent pool to collectivize the rights."10
At the same time, radio broadcasting began to move from amplification
modulation ("AM") technologies, which convey information by modulating
the amplitude of a carrier wave, to frequency modulation ("FM") technolo-
gies that embed information in the frequency of the wave and permit more
channels to share close proximity. The classic history views existing AM
radio owners like Radio Corporation of America ("RCA") as resisting the
move to FM, and the success of FM as attributable to one man, Edwin Arm-
strong.' Frost, however, "argues that FM emerged not so much from the
mind of a single man but from a decades-long incremental and evolutionary
process involving dozens of individuals.""' He identifies a number of others
who developed FM technology before Armstrong." 13 He also notes that most
of the FM patenting during the developmental period was done by the large,
existing technology companies in radio."' Indeed, Armstrong himself had a
collaborative relationship with RCA.15
Radio, then, developed in a complex pattern of incremental improve-
ment that featured both independent development by different inventors and
incremental improvement by a group of interrelated people who sometimes
cooperated, sometimes competed, and sometimes sued each other.
Television. Philo T. Farnsworth is the canonical father of television.
16
While his name is not as well known as Edison, Bell, or the Wright
Brothers, he has been popularized recently in the well-known play The
Farnsworth Invention, and there is even a statue of him in San
Francisco. 117 Farnsworth succeeded in patenting his invention and
108. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2-11 (1934);
GEORGE H. DOUGLAS, THE EARLY DAYS OF RADIO BROADCASTING 11-12 (1987).
109. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 133-34.
110. Grindley & Teece, supra note 99, at 10-12.
111. See LAWRENCE LESSING, MAN OF HIGH FIDELITY: EDWIN HOWARD ARMSTRONG
279-85, 289 (1956).
112. FROST, supra note 102, at 2.
113. Id. at 23-53.
114. Id. at 57 ("An examination of FM radiotelephone patent applications filed from
1913 through the 1930s indicates that the development of frequency-modulation radio oc-
curred predominantly in three large corporations headquartered in the northeastern United
States: RCA, Westinghouse, and, far less productively, AT&T.").
115. See id. at 69-74.
116. See DONALD G. GODFREY, PHILO T. FARNSWORTH: THE FATHER OF TELEVISION
(2001).
117. Andy Wright, Philo T Farnsworth Statue, N.Y TIMES, May 8, 2011, at A23.
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enforcing it in litigation, 118 although his opponent, RCA, ultimately
prevailed in the marketplace.
But Farnsworth built on a long list of prior work by others. From the
early days of sound radio, inventors sought ways to send images as well as
sound over the radio, in effect combining the wireless telegraph with Edi-
son's movie projector.' Many different inventors tackled different aspects
of the problem, including Charles Francis Jenkins and Ernst Alexander-
son.1 20 As Webb puts it,
the development of television was simply too large an enterprise to have
been the sole work of one gifted individual or even an inspired group....
In the case of television, however, there was a lengthy preamble of inde-
pendent and uncoordinated effort undertaken by a great many dedicated
scientists and engineers working privately all around the world. 2'
Indeed, these prior inventors actually made and implemented working
televisions. Fisher notes the work of others:
Jenkins was not the only one to take up the baton from Alexanderson. Once
these two had shown that television was a real possibility, others began
building transmitters and receivers, and during the first few months of
1928, radio stations in New York, Boston, and Chicago began televising,
with thousands of people across the country buying or building receivers.
22
What Farnsworth actually designed was a television receiver. But he
wasn't the first to invent that either. As previously noted, receivers were al-
ready on the market in the 1920s. The receiver needed a means of projecting
the image onto a screen. Vladimir Zworykin, working at Westinghouse, creat-
ed the cathode ray tube, but company executives were underwhelmed and
ordered him to work on other things. 123 Farnsworth did develop the "image
dissector," the scanning mechanism that became the basis for the first func-
tional, all-electronic television. 124 But Farnsworth never made a commercially
useable image dissector.
25
It may be accurate to describe Farnsworth as an inventor of the televi-
sion, but surely not as the inventor.
The computer. There is substantial dispute as to who was the first inven-
tor of the computer. The Burks make a strong claim that it was John
118. See R.W. BURNS. TELEVISION: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE FORMATIVE
YEARS 368-69 (1998) (detailing the extensive litigation).
119. See FISHER & FISHER, supra note 74, at 40-44.
120. Id. at 15-88.
121. RICHARD C. WEBB, TELE-VISIONARIES: THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE INVENTION OF
TELEVISION 5 (2005).
122. FISHER & FISHER, supra note 74, at 91.
123. See id. at 135-37.
124. See id. at 126-34, 145-47.
125. WEBB, supra note 121, at 40.
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Atanasoff, a professor at Iowa State during World War 11.126 The Burks ar-
gue that he had completed the computer during that time. 127 Atanasoff
himself said that it was ready for patenting and that he engaged a patent
attorney to patent it, with the rights assigned to Iowa State. Nonetheless, it
was never patented. He writes,
[diuring the spring and summer of 1942, I continued to work with [Iowa
State] and Mr. Trexler to get the patent under way. There always seemed to
be some reason why it should be put off, however, and put off it was. The
patent was never applied [for] by Iowa State College, probably due to
short-term financial considerations.
28
What most people know to be the first computer, the Electronic Numeri-
cal Integrator and Computer ("ENIAC"), was developed by the Ballistics
Research Laboratory in Maryland to assist in the preparation of firing tables
for artillery. 129 It was completed at the University of Pennsylvania's Moore
School of Electrical Engineering in November 1945 and made public the
following February. 130 While it was long treated as the first computer and
was in fact patented, the ENIAC patent was held unenforceable on the
ground that it was improperly derived from Atanasoff.13
But there are other claimants to the title of inventor of the computer.
Many significant advances in computing came from the development of
radar analysis and display systems by the U.S. and British militaries during
World War II. But the Germans were active in the same fields during the
war. Indeed, German civil engineer Konrad Zuse invented the world's first
programmable electric computer in 1941. The Z3 Adder wasn't developed
much further, and the only working copy was destroyed in an Allied bomb-
ing raid in 1944. But Zuse patented his invention, and IBM bought rights to
those patents in 1946.132
Lasers. The laser was invented in 1957 in a physics laboratory at
Columbia University that was working with "masers," which stimulated
microwaves until they were emitted in a coherent beam. A team of profes-
sors at Columbia (Charles Townes and Arthur Schawlow) and a graduate
student working with them (Gordon Gould) submitted separate patent appli-
126. ALICE R. BURKS & ARTHUR W. BURKS, THE FIRST ELECTRONIC COMPUTER
(1988); accord CLARK R. MOLLENHOFFATANASOFF: FORGOTTEN FATHER OF THE COMPUTER
(1988).
127. See BURKS & BURKS, supra note 126, at 277-78.
128. John V. Atanasoff, Advent of Electronic Digital Computing, in COMPUTER PIO-
NEERS 28, 37 (J.A.N. Lee ed., 1995).
129. Id.
130. See T.R. Kennedy Jr., Electronic Computer Flashes Answers, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 15,
1946, at 1.
131. Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 4-67 Civ. 138, 1973 WL 903, at *7,
"14--21 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 1973).
132. JOHN ALDERMAN, CORE MEMORY: A VISUAL SURVEY OF VINTAGE COMPUTERS 10
(2007).
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cations for an "optical maser," or laser.'33 The applications were put into
interference, which was then appealed within the patent office and eventual-
ly to the court of appeals. The court of appeals declared Townes and
Schawlow the first inventors in 1966.' But Gould continued to pursue pa-
tents on his invention and obtained a fundamental patent in 1977. He
enforced it in court, but did not ultimately prevail until 1988, thirty-one
years after the invention of the laser and nearly thirty years after it was first
put into practical use.
1 35
This interference is not a true case of independent invention, because the
claimants were all working together. However, they were not the only ones
working on the problem. And none of the competing claimants were the first
to actually produce a working laser; Theodore Maiman did that in 1960.136
Polymer chemistry. The development of polypropylene was a true ena-
bling technology, opening up a variety of fields from fabrics to plastics.
Who actually first developed polypropylene was a matter of considerable
dispute. The resolution depended on whether the first crystalline form or the
later development of an actual usable form counted as the first true inven-
tion. Multiple patent applicants claimed to be first, and the interference did
not resolve until 1982, twenty-eight years after the 1954 invention of poly-
propylene.137
There are many other examples I could discuss in more detail.138 But the
message should be clear. Even the inventions that seem the most significant
133. For a detailed discussion, see NICK TAYLOR, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL
LAUREATE, AND THE THIRTY-YEAR PATENT WAR (2000).
134. See Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
135. See Kenneth Chang, Gordon Gould, 85, Figure in Invention of the Laser, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A27.
136. See TAYLOR, supra note 133, at 114-17.
137. The patent was filed on June 8, 1955, id. at 374 n.5, and issued on February 6,
1973, U.S. Patent No. 3,715,344 (filed June 8, 1955) (issued Feb. 6, 1973). The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") declared the multiparty interference on Septem-
ber 9, 1958. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D. Del.
1980). The BPAI issued its final opinion on priority on November 29, 1971. Id. at 375. The
BPAI decision was appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
id. at 370, and then to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, see Standard Oil Co. (Ind.)
v. Montedison, S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. For instance:
Gutenberg was not the first to invent printing, or a printing press. He did develop
moveable type, but the same basic idea had been developed in Asia centuries before,
and was the subject of independent work in the West by Johann Fust and Lauren
Coster. EDMUND C. ARNOLD, INK ON PAPER 2: A HANDBOOK OF THE GRAPHIC
ARTS 4 (1972); WARREN CHAPPELL & ROBERT BRINGHURST, A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE PRINTED WORD 5-6 (2d ed. rev. & updated 1999); J. MORT, THE ANATO-
MY Of XEROGRAPHY: ITS INVENTION AND EVOLUTION 194-95 (1989).
The telescope was independently developed by six different inventors in 1608 and
1609. See, e.g., LAMB & EASTON, supra note 6, at 145; Samson Vermont, Inde-




* The first electrical battery was invented independently in 1745 and 1746 by Dean
von Kleist and Cuneus of Leyden. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 34.
* Two different scientists (Joseph Priestly and Carl Wilhelm Scheele) discovered
oxygen independently of each other in the 1770s. Id.
* The corset, itself the subject of one of the best-known Supreme Court patent cas-
es, Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881), was itself the result of independent
invention by multiple parties and a web of patent litigation. See Kara W. Swanson,
Getting a Grip on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 57 (2011).
* Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace developed the theory of evolution
mostly independently of each other in the 1850s, though they had shared some
background research on species. Wallace sent his manuscript to Darwin in 1858,
which prompted Darwin to finish his own book On the Origin of Species the fol-
lowing year; the Linnean Society had both of them present their works together.
Natural Selection: Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, UNDERSTANDING
EVOLUTION, http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/history 14 (last visit-
ed Oct. 28, 2011).
* William Shockley's invention of the transistor at Bell Labs appears to have been
anticipated by the work of Julius Edgar Lilienfeld. MICHAEL RIORDAN & LILLIAN
HODDESON, CRYSTAL FIRE: THE BIRTH OF THE INFORMATION AGE 146 (1997).
And Herbert Matare and Heinrich Welker invented a "transistron" in Germany
during World War II, disclosing their invention in 1948 at about the same time that
Bell Labs did. See Paul Rako, Who Invented Something Depends on Your Defini-
tion of "Something", ELECTRONICS DESIGN, STRATEGY, NEWS (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.edn.com/blog/Anablog/40527-Who-invented-something-depends-on_
your definition oftsomething_.php.
* James Watson and Francis Crick published their work on the double-helix struc-
ture of DNA in 1953. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose
Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). They were aware when they published the
work that they were in a race with Linus Pauling, who had published a paper hy-
pothesizing a triple rather than a double helix. Watson and Crick later said that they
thought Pauling was only six weeks away from discovering his error when Watson
and Crick made their discovery. Read the Document that Started a Revolution, Ex-
PLORATORIUM, http://www.exploratorium.edu/origins/coldspring/ideas/index.html
(click the "Pauling" link in the article text) (annotating Watson & Crick, supra).
* Jack Kilby at TI Texas Instruments and Robert Noyce at Fairchild invented the in-
tegrated circuit (an electrical circuit built into a single piece of silicon)
independently within a few months of each other. RIORDAN & HODDESON, supra,
at 256-65. Noyce said the simultaneous invention was no accident, because the in-
vention built on existing knowledge coupled with the availability of new materials.
"There is no doubt in my mind that if the invention hadn't arisen at Fairchild, it
would have arisen elsewhere in the very near future .... It was an idea whose time
had come .... Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties litigated for
years over their rights to the integrated circuit before settling the dispute with a cross-
license. Historic Figures: Kilby and Noyce (1923-2005), BBC, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic-figures/kilby-and-noyce.shtml (last visited Oct.
28, 2011).
* The implementation of Noyce and Kilby's integrated circuit on a computer chip
was the subject of a long patent dispute between two competing independent in-
ventors. Gary W. Boone first filed a patent application disclosing an integrated
circuit on July 19, 1971. See U.S. Statutory Invention Registration No. US H11970
H, at [63] (filed July 1, 1990) (stating that the filing was a "continuation of appli-
cation No. 05/163,565, filed on Jul. 19, 1971, now abandoned"). Interference No.
102,598 was declared on March 27, 1991, and the BPAI finally reconsidered its
earlier decision of priority on May 10, 1996. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 E3d 1348, 1351
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departures from the prior art are in fact generally the products either of sim-
ultaneous independent invention or of incremental development from
multiple sources, or both.
C. The Exceptions
Every rule has exceptions. 39 There are a few examples of significant in-
ventions that really do seem to be singletons.
Notable about these exceptions is that many of them reflect opportunis-
tic exploitation of accidental discoveries rather than conscious invention.14°
Alexander Fleming discovered the antibacterial properties of penicillin be-
cause a sample of bacteria had accidentally been contaminated with mold. 141
No one is sure where the mold came from; Fleming's discovery was true
serendipity. 142 Even in that case, there is some evidence that others made the
same accidental discovery. 143 The adhesive behind the Post-it note was de-
veloped in 1968, and languished at 3M for six years before a different 3M
employee hit on the idea of putting it to use attaching a bookmark to a
book.1" Charles Goodyear discovered vulcanized rubber when a batch of
rubber was accidentally left on a stove; Goodyear had previously thought
that heat was a problem for rubber, not the solution. 145 Wilson Greatbatch
n.l (Fed. Cir. 1998). An opinion in the last appeal of the BPAI's decision awarding
priority to Boone was issued on August 26, 1998. See id. at 1348.
* The jet engine was developed in Britain by Frank Whittle and in Germany by
Hans von Ohain and Max Hahn at roughly the same time, using the same princi-
ples. MOKYR, supra note 20, at 101 n.39.
* The human genome was sequenced by two different groups working in parallel, at
the same time and with knowledge of each other. One was the publicly financed
Human Genome Project, and the other a private venture by Craig Venter at Celera.
The two groups reached their conclusions and published their results within two
months of each other. See Int'l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium et al., Ini-
tial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860 (2001); J.
Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304
(2001).
139. Except this one.
140. For a discussion of accidental inventions, see Sean B. Seymore, Atypical Inven-
tions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057, 2063-70 (2011).
141. KEVIN BROWN, PENICILLIN MAN: ALEXANDER FLEMING AND THE ANTIBIOTIC
REVOLUTION (2004); GWYN MACFARLANE, ALEXANDER FLEMING: THE MAN AND THE
MYTH (1984).
142. MACFARLANE, supra note 141, at viii (describing the discovery as the result of "a
series of chance events of almost unbelievable improbability").
143. See id. at 90.
144. HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF USEFUL THINGS 84-86 (1992); Inventor of
the Week Archive: Art Fry & Spencer Silver, MASS. INST. OF TECH. SCH. OF ENG'G LEMEL-
SON-MIT PROGRAM, http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/frysilver.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
145. See HAROLD EVANS ET AL., THEY MADE AMERICA 97 (2004). Goodyear rejected
the notion that this was an accident, saying that "[lJike the falling of an apple, it was sugges-
tive of an important fact to one whose mind was previously prepared to draw an inference."
Id. at 98. Nonetheless, despite his years of experiments, Goodyear's success came not from
one of those experiments but from chance.
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developed the pacemaker after he accidentally grabbed the wrong resistor
from a box when he was completing a circuit.146 Louis Daguerre invented
film when, having failed to produce an image on an iodized silver plate, he
put the plate away in a cabinet filled with chemicals and the fumes from a
spilled jar of mercury produced an image on the plate.
147 And so on.' 4 1
And then there is the photocopier. Chester Carlson (a patent attorney)
invented the electrostatic photocopier decades before anyone else developed
a similar technology.149 Carlson himself was, of course, building on the
shoulders of others, and other efforts at automated reproduction were un-
derway at the time of his invention. He was "[a]ware that silver halide
photography and other light-induced chemical phenomena were exhaustive-
ly being pursued in the research laboratories of major corporations."'150 But
Carlson turned away from that avenue and toward the use of electrostatic
forces on glass to collect a toner. Even then, Carlson's first step was to con-
duct "an extensive literature search" of relevant reports and patents; he dis-
discovered that over 150 years prior to his invention, many phenomena and
devices had been explored in (usually) isolated experiments, often involving
electrostatic effects.' 15 Some of those old physics experiments set out the
science behind the technology that became xerography.
5
1
Mort argues that even the photocopier example shows the interrelated-
ness of invention:
From afar [inventions] appear as self-contained and clearly definable enti-
ties that spontaneously emerged from the mind and hands of one
person.... Closer examination, however, reveals a much more complex
situation. Inventions are commonly produced in a climate of intense com-
petition with a number of individuals striving to achieve similar ends, so
146. WILSON GREATBATCH, THE MAKING OF THE PACEMAKER: CELEBRATING A LIFE-
SAVING INVENTION 30 (2000); JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 135-36; Top 10 Accidental
Inventions: No. 2-Pacemaker, Sci. CHANNEL, http://science.discovery.com/brink/top-ten/
accidental-inventions/inventions-02.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
147. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 134-35. Note, however, that despite the serendipity of
Daguerre's invention, he shares credit for the invention of the photograph with independent
inventor William Henry Fox Talbot, and both were in fact predated by other, cameraless
means of reproduction. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, An Image Is a Mystery for Photo Detec-
tives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at El.
148. For additional examples, including dynamite, the phonograph, X-rays, Teflon, and
Velcro, see DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIus: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
CREATIVITY 35-36 (1999); Paul Thagard & David Croft, Scientific Discovery and Technolog-
ical Innovation: Ulcers, Dinosaur Extinction, and the Programming Language Java, in
MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 125, 126 (Lorenzo Magnani et al. eds.,
1999).
149. DAVID OWEN, COPIES IN SECONDS 89 (2004).
150. MORT, supra note 138, at 49.
151. Id. at 49-52. That work includes Villarsy's work on revealing electrostatically
recorded images in 1780s, id. at 49, 60, and physicist Paul Selenyi's experiments with "elec-
trography" in the 1920s and 1930s, which paralleled Carlson's work and which Carlson
credited as inspirational, id. at 49-52.
152. Id. at 1-3, 49, 60.
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that any retrospective analysis has to contend with defining the actual in-
vention.'53
And Carlson himself said that "[t]hings don't come to mind readily all of a
sudden, like pulling things out of the air. You have to get your inspiration
from somewhere and usually you get it from reading something else."' 5
Mort accordingly concludes that Carlson's invention "fits the classic mold"
of incremental improvement.'
But on balance I don't think the photocopier can be counted as either a
case of simultaneous invention or of incremental improvement. Carlson did
go down a different path, and there is no evidence of simultaneous or near-
simultaneous invention. Indeed, Mort notes that "had Carlson been totally
influenced by the state of knowledge in 1938 he might have been inclined to
drop the whole idea" of electrostatic glass, since the rest of the world
seemed focused on the use of crystals.'56
David Owen, in his history of the photocopier, underscores both this fact
and its rarity:
Few big inventions truly have a single inventor; most technological revolu-
tions are essentially collective efforts, arising in several minds and in
several places at more or less the same time, generated as much by cultural
pressures as by spontaneous individual insight .... Carlson, in contrast,
was genuinely alone. He always credited Selenyi with having inspired him,
but Selenyi never saw the connections that Carlson did .... Carlson alone
thought of a way to make copies easily and quickly on plain paper; no one
yet has come up with a better way of doing it.'57
History, then, overwhelmingly suggests that inventions-even so-called
pioneering inventions-are actually incremental improvements made at
roughly the same time by multiple inventors. That doesn't mean the inven-
tions I have catalogued here have no value; far from it. Edison, Wright, Bell,
and the rest made useful contributions to society. But they did not invent
things out of whole cloth.
The few cases that don't involve simultaneous work are mostly the re-
sult not of deliberate invention but of accident. The photocopier seems the
primary exception to this story, the rare case in which a single inventor
working alone developed a wholly new product that no one else achieved at
roughly the same time.
153. Id. at 194; see id. at 194-203 (comparing the development of xerography with the
development of other famous inventions).
154. Id. at 49.
155. Id. at 196.
156. Id. at 70.
157. OWEN, supra note 149, at 89.
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II. THEORY DIVORCED FROM HISTORY
A. Is Patent Law Encouraging New Inventions?
Patent law focuses on extraordinary inventions-things that could not be
done by people having ordinary skill in the art. The rationale is straightfor-
ward: if scientists can develop a new invention in the course of their regular
work, the law doesn't need to encourage that work with exclusivity, and
granting one party control over those obvious inventions will interfere with
the development and implementation of those ideas by others. By contrast,
nonobvious inventions-those that require extraordinary skill or some in-
sight beyond ordinary scientific endeavor-presumably won't be developed
by multiple inventors and may need or at least benefit from the incentive
that exclusivity provides.
This basic rationale underlies the orthodox utilitarian theory of patent
law. We grant patents, on this theory, to encourage inventions we wouldn't
otherwise get. And we do so at substantial cost, both in terms of static inef-
ficiency and in terms of lost opportunities for future improvement. 5 s As I
have explained elsewhere, these costs fall into five categories:
First, intellectual property rights distort markets away from the competitive
norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies in the form of deadweight
losses. Second, intellectual property rights interfere with the ability of other
creators to work, and therefore create dynamic inefficiencies. Third, the
prospect of intellectual property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior
that is socially wasteful. Fourth, enforcement of intellectual property rights
imposes administrative costs. Finally, overinvestment in research and de-
velopment is itself distortionary.'59
If we are patenting things we would have obtained without the cost of a
patent, then on this theory we're wasting our money and probably harming
rather than helping innovation downstream. Even some alternatives to the
basic incentive story also proceed from this baseline assumption. John
Duffy's "inducement theory," for example, takes this theoretical baseline
158. For discussion of those costs, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, The Economics
of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tx. L. REV. 989, 996-97 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] and Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1031 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding].
159. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 158, at 1058-59. For discussion of the economics
of these costs, see, for example, WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WEL-
FARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70-90 (1969); EM.
SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
613-30 (3d ed. 1990) (documenting patent holders pricing in excess of cost); and Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990).
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seriously, suggesting that we ought to protect only those things that would
not have been created or disclosed absent a patent system.
60
The overwhelming prevalence of both independent invention and incre-
mental contribution calls this basic incentive story into serious question.
Sam Vermont argues that independent invention is evidence that patents
overreward invention in a particular industry, because it means either it was
easier to do than we thought, so that we would have gotten the invention
without the lure of the patent, or we encouraged too much entry in research-
ing the idea, so that the patent incentive could have been reduced. 6 '
The same is arguably true of incremental invention. If our "pioneering"
inventors are in fact engaged in normal science, tinkering with the work of
those who came before rather than inventing something wholly new, the
traditional incentive case for patent protection is weakened dramatically.
The work may be obvious, or perhaps not, under the patent law,'62 but it is
in any event incremental rather than pioneering. Brian Love has accordingly
called for the elimination of the pioneering patents doctrine. 6 3 And if inno-
vation is incremental, not discrete, a substantial literature suggests that we
should limit patent rights substantially, because granting strong patent rights
to one inventor in the chain will significantly restrain incremental innovation
by later inventors.' 64
Finally, the presence of some patent rights (though not strong ones) may
affect the market structure of industries. Jonathan Barnett argues that indus-
tries with patent protection are more likely to disaggregate into
manufacturing and inventing units; the presence of a patent right allows par-
ties to achieve by contracting what they might otherwise have to achieve by
vertical integration. 65 Barnett sees this as supporting the incentive story of
patents, 66 although it might more reasonably be thought of as a commer-
cialization story. In fact, it is not clear that we need particularly strong
patents, or even patents at all, to achieve this effect; any sort of property
160. See Michael Abramowicz & John F Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patenta-
bility, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011); see also John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to
Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343 (2008).
161. See Vermont, supra note 138.
162. While the inventions I described in Part I are not "obvious" to the layman, the fact
that scientists working in the field achieved those inventions at about the same time is evi-
dence that they are obvious in a legal sense. But there is room in the legal standard for
nonobvious inventions to be straightforward to a few people of extraordinary skill, so long as
the ordinary scientist could not have achieved them. See generally supra Part I.
163. See Love, supra note 25.
164. See, e.g., Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 158; Merges & Nelson,
supra note 159.
165. Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL.
L. REV. 785, 819-21 (2011); see also Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks
Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 575, 588.
166. Barnett, supra note 165.
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right might provide the parties a basis on which to contract, even one that
does not cover independent invention.
167
Boldrin and Levine go so far as to call for the elimination of all pa-
tents. 168 While I don't think such a radical step is warranted, it should be
clear that the claim that we need strong patents to encourage discrete, new
inventions by those of extraordinary skill is largely belied by history.169 The
patent system may encourage the occasional Chester Carlson to come up
with something entirely new, but patent owners--even the owners of the
most famous and important inventions-are overwhelmingly not people
who have invented something no one else could have done. They are mak-
ing incremental improvements alongside others tackling the same problem
and often coming up with the same solution at about the same time.
B. Commercializing Inventions
The dominant alternative theory of patent law focuses not on incentives
to invent, but on the development and commercialization of an invention
once it has been made.170 I have previously referred to these theories as "ex
post" rather than "ex ante" theories of intellectual property ("IP") because
they focus on encouraging behavior after invention, not before. 171 There are
two different strands of this commercialization literature. First, Ed Kitch
argues that we should grant broad patents over inventions in order to give
the owners of those broad patents the incentive to further develop the
field. 72 This "prospect" theory analogizes patents to mining claims: give the
patentee control over a certain area and it will have every incentive to max-
imize the value of that space. The future development with which Kitch
167. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 335-37 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Surprising Virtues] (argu-
ing that trade secrets serve the same purpose).
168. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 103, at 15.
169. A growing literature suggests that external incentives are not the primary driver of
invention. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Fromer, Expressive Incentives], available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/Expressive-Incentives-i
n_IntellectualProperty.pdf; Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy,
39 FLA. ST, U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1746343.
170. Joseph Schumpeter famously distinguished between invention-the development
of a new idea-and innovation, which is the implementation of that idea in practical form.
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (5th ed. 1976).
For discussions of the distinction, see, for example, RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WIN-
TER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1982); Oren Bar-Gill &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEx. L. REV. 395, 398 (2005);
and Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust, in ANTI-
TRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 48-49 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece
eds., 1992).
171. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 129 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, ExAnte].
172. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 275-80 (1977).
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seems concerned is primarily improvement, though his argument certainly
has implications for bringing an invention to market.
More recently, a number of scholars have begun to argue for the protec-
tion of commercialization more directly. Michael Abramowicz argues that
people won't have an incentive to be the first to bring a new product to mar-
ket absent some form of market exclusivity.173 He and John Duffy have
accordingly proposed keying patent protection not to inventive difficulty but
to the need to invest in creating a new market. 7 4 Ted Sichelman applies the
Abramowicz-Duffy framework to argue for "commercialization patents"
that give exclusive rights to the first to bring an invention to market. Sichel-
man would require that the invention being commercialized be both new
and nonobvious, 7 5 though it's not entirely clear why; his theory would seem
to apply equally well to any product not on the market, no matter how old or
straightforward the invention was. Most radically, Ben Roin proposes grant-
ing patents to old drugs in order to encourage pharmaceutical companies to
test and sell those drugs. 7 6 These authors depart more fundamentally from
traditional patent law principles. Their proposed exclusivity isn't focused on
encouraging improvement inventions, but on the purported undercommer-
cialization of any sort of new product faced with market competition,
obvious or not.
For our purposes, the relevant question is whether commercialization
theory in either form offers a reason to grant broad patent rights to an inven-
tor even though the patent wasn't necessary to induce the invention. I think
not.
Both prospect and commercialization theories have a number of prob-
lems. Prospect theory has been extensively (and to my mind devastatingly)
critiqued elsewhere as a matter of theory. 77 Similarly, I have argued that the
commercialization theory fundamentally misapprehends market dynamics-
that, as Hayek observes,' 78 we don't normally need supracompetitive returns
or the prospect of exclusivity just to encourage someone to take an existing
invention to market. 7 9 The primary problems stem from the assumption
both theories make that we need central control of either improvement or
marketing in order to efficiently encourage the controller to invest in those
173. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1065 (2007); accord F Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).
174. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experi-
mentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008).
175. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010).
176. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEx. L. REV. 503, 557-58 (2009). The logic of Abramowicz and Duffy's proposal also points
in that direction, though they do not go that far.
177. See, e.g., Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 158, 1048-58; Lemley,
Free Riding, supra note 158; Merges & Nelson, supra note 159, at 871-75.
178. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 524
(1945).
179. Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 171, at 134-37.
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activities. 180 Ordinary economic rents, coupled with nonpatent advantages
such as first-mover benefits and brand reputation, have long proved suffi-
cient to encourage entry into new markets even in the absence of patent
protection. We don't have computer software or social networks because of
patents; indeed, if anything, patents interfere with market entry in those
fields.
Nor is there good reason to believe that patents (at least as currently
conceived) would be a particularly good solution to undercommercialization
if we thought it was a problem. Patents are generally not coextensive with
market entry rights; they might cover one product that competes with anoth-
er in a market, or (more likely) cover one small aspect of a product. Those
patents can't meaningfully serve commercialization ends. 81 And because
patents today take an average of four years after filing to issue, 82 they rarely
support new commercialization; market entry in most fields today occurs
well before the relevant patent rights are even granted, much less litigated.
Even if we thought there was a market failure to be solved in under-
commercialization, and that patents might be well positioned to solve it,
there is good reason to fear that the costs of granting commercialization
patents far exceed the benefits. 18 3 There are a number of structural reasons
monopolists are actually poor managers of an invention. They have less in-
centive to come up with disruptive new technologies that improve on the
initial invention, because most of the sales they would displace are their
own."8 They may simply decide to make money from their existing inven-
tion rather than keep working to improve it. Watt took that approach with
180. The classic argument cited in favor of monopolists coordinating innovation is
Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 170, at
106. For an application to patent law, see Kieff, supra note 173, and Kitch, supra note 172.
Cf Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products
Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1996) (suggesting that incentives be weighted to-
ward pioneers).
181. To be fair, Kitch and Sichelman may be arguing not for the existing patent system,
but for some hypothetical different system that might serve their ends. But the fact that to-
day's patent law doesn't serve that end means that they can't point to it to explain the
commercialization we have seen without the broader patents they envision.
182. In the late 1990s the average delay was 2.77 years. John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000). And it has increased significantly since then. Ron D. Katznelson,
The Perfect Storm of Patent Reform? (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/
rkatznelson/54.
183. As Michael Burstein observes, commercialization theories often focus on the puta-
tive benefits of patents for commercialization, but "generally do not take account of the
dynamic social costs that accompany intellectual property." Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging
Information Without Intellectual Property 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
184. MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVA-
TION 29-30 (1982); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 620 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research ed., 1962), reprinted in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW 104,
115-17 (1985).
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his steam engine.185 Edison acted the same way in the lightbulb market, rest-
ing on his patent and his 75 percent market share rather than improving his
technology.
18 6
Even if the owner of a commercialization patent has an interest in im-
proving the invention, he may not be very good at it. Economists have
suggested that large firms may simply be structurally less able to innovate
than small start-ups; 8 7 the very success of a firm with a strong monopoly
right may make it harder for that firm to keep up with market developments.
And even a well-motivated and talented improver will not be best situated to
develop all possible improvements and commercial applications in-house.
The existence of a strong controlling patent means that anyone who has a
new idea for how to use or improve an invention must get permission from
the central controller. And there are lots of reasons why efficient licensing
may not occur.'88 Even if it does occur, the requirement for coordination can
lead to delay and can stifle later creativity. 18 9 Rent seeking is also a concern
here, just as it was under the incentive-to-invent theory. Indeed, the risk may
be much stronger, because under commercialization theory applicants are
seeking a much broader patent right with which to coordinate subsequent
economic activity.190
We can draw useful lessons about the value of central coordination in
encouraging ex post behavior from the exceptional cases in which an inven-
tor did come up with something new, particularly when he obtained
substantial patent rights. Those lessons are not encouraging for granting
broad exclusivity. First, singleton invention does not necessarily lead to
185. F.M. Scherer, Invention and Innovation in the Watt-Boulton Steam-Engine Venture,
6 TECH. & CULTURE 165, 174 (1965). In a letter, Watt wrote that "it [is] now full time to
cease attempting to invent new things, or to attempt anything which is attended with any risk
of not succeeding .... Let us go on executing the things we understand . I..." Id
186. ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 91-92, 122 (1949).
187. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 170, at 279 (stating that large firm structure may
be inimical to radical innovation).
188. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1072-73 (1989) ("The risk that the parties
will be unable to agree on terms for a license is greatest when subsequent researchers want to
use prior inventions to make further progress in the same field in competition with the patent
holder, especially if the research threatens to render the patented invention technologically
obsolete."); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 158, at 1048-72 (offering a
variety of reasons why granting exclusive control to pioneers is inefficient); Robert Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62
TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Blocking Patents]; Merges & Nelson, supra
note 159.
189. See ERIC VON HiPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 131-207 (1988); Robert
P. Merges, Commentary, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-
Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 381 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, Rent Control].
190. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980); see also John F. Duffy, The Marginal




quick commercialization. Quite the contrary: the few cases of substantial
inventions made only by one inventive group generally involve quite a sub-
stantial delay between invention and commercialization. We waited more
than two decades after Carlson's invention for a working photocopier, 191 and
it was not until after his core patents expired that we got plain-paper copi-
ers. Alexander Fleming published his results in 1929, but it was more than a
decade before anyone began to exploit that idea. 92 For almost a decade,
much of the medical world regarded the discovery of penicillin as of little to
no consequence. And when doctors did begin to imagine the therapeutic uses
of the mold, it was not Fleming who led the way. It eventually fell to Florey's
team at Oxford and to William Foley, Ernst Chain, Norman Heatley, and a
small group of other researchers to extract penicillin for therapeutic use and
theorize its chemical structure; 193 the use in medical treatment came still
later. Edison's lightbulb was somewhat better than the ones that came before
it, but his patents were sufficiently broad that they shut down any further
efforts to innovate by others until the core patent expired. 94 Edison, mean-
while, stopped working on improving lightbulb technology after capturing
the market and turned his attention to other inventions. 195
Relatedly, it is notable that initial inventors (whether singletons or multi-
ples) frequently turn out to be pretty bad at commercializing their own
inventions. Sometimes the problem is an understandable disconnect between
the skills associated with invention and those associated with building a manu-
facturing business. But it is also quite common that inventors of important new
technologies miss the importance of those technologies. Marconi thought the
use of wireless radio technology would be to permit ships at sea to communi-
cate with each other; 196 while that is a use, it is hardly the most important one.
Armstrong, the inventor of FM radio, thought he had invented a way of ex-
tending the reach of AM radio and broadening its bandwidth; he missed the
things (like the absence of static) that actually made FM a success. 197 Bell
described his telephone as an "Improvement[] in Telegraphy,"' 98 and West-
ern Union turned down an opportunity to buy the patent for $100,000,
rejecting the telephone as "inherently of no value to us."'199 IBM didn't fore-
191. Carlson invented xerography in 1938, MORT, supra note 138, at 53, but the Xerox
914 copier was not marketed until 1959, id. at 66-69.
192. Mary Bellis, The History of Penicillin, ABOUT.COm, http://inventors.about.conod/
pstartinventions/a/Penicillin.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
193. BROWN, supra note 141, at 106-21; MACFARLANE, supra note 141, at ix.
194. BRIGHT, JR., supra note 186, at 138-39; Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author).
195. BRIGHT, JR., supra note 186, at 122.
196. News Release, Stanford University, supra note 106.
197. FROST, supra note 102, at 88-91.
198. See U.S. Patent No. 174,465, col. 111. 4-5 (filed Feb. 14, 1876).
199. CHARLOTTE GRAY, RELUCTANT GENIUS: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE
PASSION FOR INVENTION 129 (2006).
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see the market for personal computers. 2° The transistor was originally
conceived as primarily useful in hearing aids.201 The steam engine was
developed to pump water out of flooded mines.2"2 Railroads were original-
ly envisioned as a way of getting goods to canals, which would be the
dominant form of overland transportation. 203 The videocassette recorder
("VCR") was initially marketed to television stations as a means of airing
reruns. 2 0 And so on.
Further, inventors are often psychologically tied to their particular solu-
tion, even in the face of later evidence that other approaches work better. The
Wright Brothers held up the development of airplanes for over a decade by
enforcing their patents broadly against aileron wing structures while relying
on their inferior wing-warping technology.25 AT&T refused to adopt the
packet-switching technology that became the basis for the internet, delaying
the deployment of that technology for decades.
20 6
This latter commercialization problem is particularly significant for what I
have called "enabling inventions": the sort of inventions that are likely to have
a variety of different applications that open new markets or are scattered
across existing markets. Inventors with one thing in mind-allowing ships to
communicate with each other, say-are likely to focus on that use, paying less
attention to other possible applications of their invention. The more control
those inventors have over these pioneering technologies, the more difficult it
may be for others to explore and implement these various new uses.0 7
The result of all these effects is that, in industry after industry, substan-
tial improvement doesn't occur until after broad pioneering patents expire or
are otherwise avoided. Pioneering patents stifled the development of both
airplanes and radio until the government stepped in and mandated that the




204. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 188, at 86 n.42.
205. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
206. RAND researcher Paul Baran proposed an early design idea for the internet to
AT&T in the early 1960s. Resistance to his design was strongest from AT&T. As John
Naughton reports, Baran recalls one particularly telling instance of AT&T's opposition:
[AT&T's] views were once memorably summarised in an exasperated outburst from
AT&T's Jack Osterman after a long discussion with Baran. "First," he said, "it can't
possibly work, and if it did, damned if we are going to allow the creation of a competi-
tor to ourselves."
JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET YEARS
IN A LIFETIME 106-07 (2000); see also KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS
STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 52-66 (1996).
207. The second strand of commercialization theory might avoid this problem by giv-
ing a different patent to each commercial implementation, but only in the more extreme form
advocated by Benjamin Roin, which divorces patents entirely from invention.
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patent owners share their technology. 2 8 Steam engines improved dramati-
cally only after the basic Boulton-Watt patents expired. 209 Sewing machines
languished in patent litigation for over a decade until the parties resolved
their dispute by forming the first patent pool.
210
By contrast, industries in which the basic technologies were not patent-
ed, or in which patent rights were either narrow or unclear during the
formative years of the industry, thrived in the absence of that strong central
patent right.
211
There is one industry in which the commercialization story actually
seems to work: pharmaceuticals. As Dan Burk and I have suggested, the
regulatory structure of the modem pharmaceutical industry makes getting a
new invention to market far more expensive and uncertain than actually de-
veloping that invention.2 12 The need for a special incentive to bring existing
drugs to market is a function of the regulatory barriers to market entry,
though, and not a general fact about innovation.
In short, the history of the most important inventions does not help to
rehabilitate either prospect or commercialization theory. Quite the contrary;
208. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 159, at 891-93 (noting Marconi's successful
effort to hold up development of the triode until the U.S. Navy stepped in to mandate crea-
tion of a patent pool).
209. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 103, at 1-2. While more recent research has cast
doubt on Boldrin and Levine's claim that the patents themselves directly suppressed im-
provements, that research suggests an alternative form of the same basic story: Watt and
Boulton stuck with an inefficient technology, and improvements occurred only because oth-
ers sought to design around that patented technology. See Selgin & Turner, supra note 30.
210. Mossoff, supra note 54.
211. As I have observed,
[t]he sum of all these stories is rather remarkable: for one reason or another, the basic
building blocks of what might be called the enabling technologies of the twentieth cen-
tury-the computer, software, the Internet, and biotechnology-all ended up in the
public domain. Whether through a policy decision, a personal belief, shortsightedness,
government regulation, or invalidation of the patent, no one ended up owning the core
building blocks of these technologies during their formative years. This does not mean
that there were no patents in these fields, or even that there were no major patents-far
from it. But the patents that were obtained and enforced in these fields tended to cover
implementations of or improvements to the basic building-block technologies. If pa-
tents were granted on the basic building blocks, it was often only after decades of
litigation over inventorship.
•.. [Tihe fact that previous enabling technologies were not generally patented may be
thought a happy accident for innovation-or at the very least for follow-on improvers
who commercialized particular implementations of these technologies and then patent-
ed those implementations.
Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 613, 620 (2005). Steven
Johnson argues that any new technology takes ten years to develop and another ten years to
be accepted. See JOHNSON supra note 2, at 13-14. But that is a description of a few exam-
ples, and hardly an inevitable rule of technological development.
212. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 80-81 (2009).
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the evidence suggests that strong patent control significantly impedes both
commercialization and improvement of new technologies. 213 If we don't
need patents to encourage new inventions, we certainly don't want to grant
them in an effort to regulate the use of those inventions in the marketplace.
C. Disclosure Theory
A traditional subsidiary justification for patent law is to encourage the
disclosure of new inventions to the world. At one time, this theory was pri-
mary. For example, when the dissemination of information was hard and
inventions were simple, governments would grant patents to the first person
to bring an invention into a country, even though he didn't invent it.214 More
recently, the patent system has been described as a bargain with the public
in which the inventor gives information about the invention in exchange for
an exclusive right.215 The benefit the public gets from the bargain, on this
theory, is not (or not just) a new invention but the publication of new learn-
ing that might otherwise have been kept secret.
Historical evidence suggests that information disclosure and spillovers
are important in the innovation process.216 Inventors learn from and build on
both their predecessors and their contemporaries. That learning quite often
provides the inventor with the key insight that leads to the invention. Infor-
mation flow, then, is something that we very much want to encourage.
Disclosure theory cannot, however, support the modem patent system.
Simply put, inventors don't learn their science from patents. The problem is
in part one of law; the Federal Circuit has permitted a number of vague gen-
eral disclosures that don't actually communicate very much to anyone, and
patent lawyers often have incentives to write such vague disclosures.2 17 So
213. For discussions of particular industries in which competition appears to spur inno-
vation, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925,
960-62 (2001) (the internet); Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual
Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (2001) (biotechnology);
and Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. Tele-
communications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 85 (telecommunications).
214. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 69, at 4-5.
215. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 225 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to a patent as a "quid pro quo" for disclosure); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (identifying the "promot[ion of] disclosure of inventions" as a key
function of the patent system); Jeanne C. Fromcr, Patent Disclosure, 94 IowA L. REV. 539,
542 (2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Patent Disclosure]; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1762793.
216. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007).
217. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 403 (2010); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or
Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2025-26 (2005). Even supporters of disclosure theory
like Fromer acknowledge that "a good deal of evidence suggests that technologists do not find
[that patents] contain[] pertinent information for their research." Fromer, Patent Disclosure,
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even those who read patents hoping to learn the state of the art would be
disappointed.
218
A second problem results from the structure of the modem patent sys-
tem. The patent office is overwhelmed with work.219 Key patents that issued
in a matter of a few months in the nineteenth century take years to issue
today.220 And while a 1999 change in the law requiring that most (though
not all) patents be published eighteen months after filing is a step in the
right direction, even inventors who read published patent applications are
learning not the state of the art today, but the state of the art two to three
years earlier.
The final problem is more systemic. Because there are roughly 500,000
applications filed every year,22 and because our categorization systems are
far from perfect, 222 reading all the relevant patents in a field can be a Hercu-
lean task. And the fact that many of those patents obfuscate the technology
at issue, whether deliberately or because we lack a clear language for com-
municating some types of inventions, means that the payoff from reading
those applications is often dubious. Add to that the fact that lawyers often
advise engineers not to read competitor patents for fear of becoming a will-
ful infringer,2 3 and researching a new area of technology by reading patents
seems a doubtful idea at best. Far better for engineers to learn from article
supra note 215, at 560. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966), noted the Court's
concern with this problem nearly half a century ago; the majority and dissent disagreed over
the import of arguments "that disclosure induced by allowing a patent is partly undercut by
patent-application drafting techniques." Id. at 538 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
218. Ouellette, herself a believer in the value of disclosure, nonetheless reports that
most scientists do not find a patent disclosure sufficient to allow one of skill in the art to
reproduce the patented invention. See Ouellette, supra note 215 (manuscript at 37).
219. The patent office receives more than 500,000 applications a year. U.S. Patent Sta-
tistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2010, supra note 3. As a result, examiners have little
time to devote to any one application. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Doug Lichtman &
Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents, REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 10.
220. As noted above, the key telephone patents issued in a matter of months, sometimes
in as few as two months. See Hounshell, Two Paths, supra note 63, at 162 (Bell's patent was
issued three weeks after filing). In contrast, by the 1990s patent applications took 2.77 years
to issue on average, and this delay is only increasing. See supra note 182.
221. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, supra note 3 (showing
that more than 450,000 applications were filed in each year from 2007 to 2009).
222. On the problems with the PTO classification system, see Allison & Lemley, supra
note 182, at 2114.
223. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003); Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the
Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2023 & n.42
(2005). The problem of willful infringement has generally been thought to have diminished
since In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), but a surprising
number of cases still find willfulness. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement
and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IowA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2012) (manuscript at 26 tbl.2), available at http://works.bepress.com/christopher-
seaman/6/ (finding that willfulness findings dropped only from 48.2 to 37.4 percent after
Seagate, and that this change was not statistically significant).
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preprints, conferences, and conversations with colleagues. And indeed what
evidence we have suggests that scientists in most fields turn to those sources
for their scientific learning. If they read patents at all, it is to know what is
owned, not what is known.
2 2 4
Finally, for disclosure theory to justify the patent system, it must be the
case not only that the world actually reads patents and benefits from their
disclosure, but that the incremental learning from the patents is sufficient to
outweigh the costs to society of preventing anyone from using that learning
to implement the technology for twenty years. Even if the former case has
been made, the latter has not.
The theory that patents are valuable for the information they disclose,
then, doesn't seem to describe the real world-at least, not enough to stand
alone as a justification for having a patent system.225 But perhaps there is an
alternative formulation of this theory, one in which the patent does not so
much communicate valuable technical information itself as induce the
communication of that information by other means.
One such indirect theory is that patents encourage public disclosure of
information that would otherwise be kept secret. While the patents them-
selves don't create the useful disclosure, for the reasons just described,
perhaps the existence of a patent induces inventors to elect patent over
trade secret protection and, having done so, to publish their ideas in forms
besides just the patent. However, the available evidence suggests that
companies primarily rely on patent protection to protect self-disclosing
inventions: those that the inventor could not maintain as a trade secret
after putting it into commercial practice. If an invention can be kept se-
cret, inventors are more likely to forego patent protection and keep it
secret.226 While patent protection may induce some disclosure at the
224. See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 223, at 2023 & n.42 ("[Viery few people read
patents outside of the litigation and licensing contexts."); Note, supra note 217, at 2019-20
("[M]any innovators have ceased using patents as a research tool... "). But see Ouellette,
supra note 215 (manuscript at 61) (arguing that patents can be surprisingly useful sources of
technical information, in part because online searching makes them more accessible).
225. Even a leading defender of current disclosure theory, Lisa Ouellette, does not go
so far as to argue that disclosure theory is a valid justification for the patent system. Ouel-
lette, supra note 215 (manuscript at 1). She makes no attempt to measure the social cost of
patents or to compare the two, instead arguing only that if we already have a patent system,
we are better off with one that requires disclosure because it may promote some learning. Id.
(manuscript at 5). That may be true, but, as she acknowledges, it is not a freestanding justifi-
cation for a patent system.
226. Three major cross-sectional surveys of inventors and R&D managers find that they
are much more likely to turn to the patent system to protect self-disclosing than non-self-
disclosing inventions. See Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium, 26 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 1153 (2008); Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incen-
tives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349, 1350 (2002); Richard
C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (all finding that patents are less important in
technologies like process manufacturing that are easier to keep secret). For a theoretical
explanation of why this might be so, see Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 107-11.
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margins, trade secret law appears to do as much or more than patent law to
encourage the disclosure of non-self-disclosing inventions 227 And even if a
party chose patent protection, it doesn't follow that it would decide to make
the information available to competitors in other, more useful formats.
A second theory of indirect disclosure relies not on public disclosure of
an invention but on the private communication of that invention. Arrow's
Information Paradox suggests that parties may find it difficult to contract to
disclose information in the absence of a property right over that infor-
mation.228 Perhaps patents permit the licensing not of the patents them-
themselves, 229 but of valuable information that would otherwise not have
been disclosed among companies because of limitations in trade secret law.
On this theory, the disclosure function of patents is not a public disclosure
function at all, but a means of encouraging private technology transfer by
creating rights that can in fact be transferred.
As a matter of theory, this licensing rationale for patent law makes con-
siderable sense. But whether it is true is ultimately an empirical question.
The confidentiality of licensing agreements makes it very difficult to answer
that question. But what evidence we have is not encouraging. We know that
when patentees enforce patents in court, they virtually always do it not
against people who learned from the patentee but against independent de-
velopers. 230 We don't know the percentage of patent-licensing agreements
that actually involve real technology transfer. Real know-how transactions
often occur outside the scope of a patent license; it is the business people,
not the lawyers, who get involved. By contrast, most corporate licensing
programs seem to be an exchange of patent-license rights for money, not an
ongoing exchange of technological knowledge. Most license agreements I
have seen don't have provisions for the ongoing disclosure of know-how,
for instance. They are often cross-licenses, which tend not to involve tech-
nology transfer.
The evidence I review in this Article is somewhat mixed on the technol-
ogy transfer point. The overwhelming predominance of independent
227. Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 167, at 332-37.
228. Arrow, supra note 184, at 615 (arguing that sellers will not disclose information to
buyers absent legal protection, and so buyers will be unable to value that information). There
is substantial literature on patents as a way out of Arrow's paradox. See, e.g., James J. Anton
& Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Prop-
erty Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 190-92 (1994); Paul J. Heald, Transaction Costs and
Patent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 453-54 (2007); Robert
P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005);
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review
Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1590 (1995) (reviewing PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F SEE,
THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994)) (noting the importance of con-
tract law in intellectual property exchanges). But see Burstein, supra note 183, at 2 (arguing
that we don't need patents to solve Arrow's Information Paradox, because structured disclo-
sure of information and various other appropriability mechanisms can enable contracting).
229. Licensing of the patents themselves cannot alone justify a patent system, for there
would be no need to license patents if patent rights didn't exist.
230. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1459.
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invention suggests that most innovators are not in fact buying their
knowledge from outsiders, but are seeking to develop it on their own. On
the other hand, some of the examples I give involve inventors who set out to
find what had already been done in the field, in at least a few cases by keep-
ing up with other patents. Mostly, though, inventors sought their source of
knowledge elsewhere; they seem to have followed patents to know what
others owned, not to learn from them.
Further, as I have noted elsewhere, many features of the patent system
are not well designed to facilitate technology transfer.231 The fact that patent
applications are kept secret for at least eighteen months, the absence of any
defense for independent invention, the peripheral claiming system that en-
courages patentees to claim ground beyond what they in fact invented, the
delays in the PTO, and the ability of applicants to change their claims using
continuation applications throughout the twenty-year patent term all suggest
that the focus of patentees and patent lawyers is not on actual technology
transfer but on maximizing the scope of legal rights.
That doesn't mean that patents play no role in technology transfer. The
evidence from developing nations suggests that they do-that the developed
world is more likely to share technology with countries that have at least
some effective level of patent protection.232 And we can imagine changes to
our patent law that would make it more effective in encouraging technology
transfer in this country.233 But it means that licensing theory today can't be a
full explanation for the pattern of licensing and enforcement behavior we
observe.
III. PATENT RACES: TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY OF PATENT LAW
The three basic competing theories of patent law, then, don't seem to
mesh with the realities of innovation. 4 That's a problem. Does it mean that
231. See Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19-20 [hereinafter
Lemley, Ignoring Patents].
232. L. Kamran Bilir, Patent Laws, Product Lifecycle Lengths, and the Global Sourcing
Decisions of U.S. Multinationals, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON (July 5, 2011), http://
www.ssc.wisc.edu/-kbilir/Bilir IP andMNCs.pdf.
233. For some suggestions along these lines, see Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note
231, at 32-34.
234. Other, noneconomic theories of patent law are hard to take too seriously. For a
discussion of reward-based theories of scientific invention stemming from natural law, see A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 275-77 (1996) and Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Cir-
cuit's Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal
Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1051, 1077-84 (1991). Cf Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To
Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 609, 609 (1993) (arguing that desert-based
arguments for patent law are intuitively appealing but do not necessarily justify the scope of
current patent doctrine). Part of the reason is that patent law prohibits not just copying but
also independent development. Indeed, the vast majority of patent lawsuits are filed against
independent developers. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1459.
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we should throw out patent law altogether, as Boldrin and Levine suggest?
Perhaps. But before we jettison altogether what Mike Scherer calls "a sys-
tem that, despite its manifest imperfections, has worked tolerably well,
' 2 35
we should consider whether we can find a theoretical justification for patent
law that jibes with the historical evidence.
Such a justification would need to take account of the lessons of history:
Invention is a social phenomenon, not one driven by lone geniuses. In-
ventors are working in groups, interacting with each other and building
on the prior work of others. But even where they work independently,
they are often working in parallel to solve identified problems or to im-
prove existing technology.
Central control doesn't seem desirable given the actual history of im-
portant inventions. Where we have given strong control to a single
patent owner, the result has generally been reduced improvement and
delayed commercialization.
" The first mover does not necessarily have the advantage in implement-
ing pioneering inventions. While some of the examples I report above,
such as the telephone, show a significant first-mover advantage, in other
cases, like the airplane, the second mover ended up dominating the mar-
ket. Where a first mover prevails, it is generally the first to market with
significant scale, not the first to invent, who reaps that advantage.
" A patent system that encourages innovation needs to encourage the dif-
fusion of knowledge. Inventors are not working in isolation; they are
affirmatively seeking out knowledge of what others are doing in a field.
The importance of cumulative innovation suggests that we need to make
sure information is actually communicated between different workers
building on related work.
In this Part, I offer some tentative thoughts about how to incorporate
these ideas into our theories of the patent system, and a research agenda for
future work.
While patents don't seem to be encouraging the development of discrete
new ideas that no one else has, that doesn't mean they aren't motivating
innovation at all. Rather, it means that the simple incentive-to-invent story
must be complicated by the presence of competitors working to achieve the
same invention at roughly the same time. Granting a patent to the first to
achieve that goal doesn't just encourage one entrant; it may have a more
complex set of incentives for different participants depending on how they
perceive themselves relative to their competitors. The incentives provided
Jeanne Fromer argues persuasively that inventors are often incented by rewards other
than money, like prestige. See Fromer, Expressive Incentives, supra note 169. But that is a
justification for giving them those other sorts of rewards, not for giving them exclusive
rights.
235. F.M. Scherer, Book Review, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine: Against Intel-
lectual Property, 20 CoNsT. POL. EcON. 94, 97 (2009) (reviewing BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra
note 103).
[Vol. 110:709
The Myth of the Sole Inventor
by a patent, in other words, must be filtered through the realities of a patent
race.
In some (though by no means all, or even a majority) of the examples I
discussed in Part I, the inventors were acutely aware of the possibility of
patent rights and of the risk that others might obtain the core patents. The
most notable example is the telephone. Alexander Graham Bell was aware
not only of competitors working to develop a telephone but of the filing of
patent applications by those competitors. 23 6 He rushed his application to the
patent office before he finished his invention in order to avoid being
preempted by others. Even then, he didn't beat his rivals to the patent office;
Elisha Gray filed a caveat on the same day.237 Similarly, Eli Whitney was
expressly warned that competitors were working on similar inventions and
that he might lose patent rights if he didn't file quickly, which seems to have
spurred him to file his patent application.
238
Other examples involve not an explicit patent race, but plausible evi-
dence of a race to invent among different parties who were aware of each
other's work and who were racing to reach a goal before their competitors.
Edison was aware of the work of others on the lightbulb, and it is plausible
that his knowledge of that other work not only shaped his invention but
caused him to move more quickly. Similarly, the Wright Brothers recog-
nized that they were in competition with other inventive teams to be the first
to achieve powered flight. Watson and Crick knew they were racing Linus
Pauling to discover the helical structure of DNA, and winning the race was
a powerful motivator for them.23 9
Finally, even among the majority of cases in which we have no evidence
of an explicit race, that doesn't mean that there was no race. Many of the
examples show explicit awareness by the inventor of prior work in the field.
Morse, for instance, kept up with what others were doing in the field. Jen-
kins built on Edison's kinetoscope. And so on. 240 It is possible that these
inventors knew they were racing against known others working on the same
236. This was possible because patents in the 1880s issued quickly after filing. Bell's
telephone patent issued a mere three weeks after he filed it. U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed
Feb. 14, 1876) (issued Mar. 7, 1876); see also Hounshell, Two Paths, supra note 63, at 162.
Patents in the lighting field issued between two and seven months after filing. In addition, at
the time inventors could file what was known as a "caveat," indicating that they were work-
ing in an area and asking to be notified if anyone else filed a patent application in that field.
See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 40, 16 Stat. 198, 203-04 (codified at REVISED STATUTES
OF THE UNITED STATES § 4902 (1878)) (repealed 1910). Caveats were discontinued in 1910.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 414, 36 Stat. 843.
By contrast, by the late 1990s the pendency rate was an average of 2.77 years, and it
has gone up substantially since then. See supra note 182. While most applications are pub-
lished after eighteen months, even an inventor who reads those applications would find it
difficult today to know what competitors are doing in anything like real time.
237. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 77-81 (1888) (reproducing Gray's caveat of
February 14, 1876).
238. LAKWETE, supra note 38, at 55.
239. Read the Document that Started a Revolution, supra note 138.
240. For other examples, see Vermont, supra note 138, at 478-79.
March 20121
Michigan Law Review
thing. But even if they didn't know, they may well have been spurred to
quick action by the fear that unknown others were out there doing the same
thing.
Standard economic theory holds that racing, whether to develop a new
invention or to get that invention to market, is a wasteful exercise.141 After
all, the point of patent law is to encourage investments in research and de-
velopment that wouldn't otherwise be made. If two or more putative
inventors invest that money in research and development in an effort to beat
each other to the market, all but the first to invent will have wasted that
money.242 Further, they may deliberately overspend in hopes of getting the
prize of a patent, dissipating the social value of the new invention.2 43 As a
result, prospect theory justifies the central control it would provide over in-
novations in substantial part as a way of avoiding wasteful patent races.
244
241. For the standard economic analysis of patent races, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-99 (1988); Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innova-
tions, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 352 n.l 1 (1968); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz,
Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. EcON. 1 (1980); and
McFetridge & Smith, supra note 190, at 198.
For criticism of patent races, see Partha Dasgupta, The Economic Theory of Technology
Policy: An Introduction, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 7, 21
(Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman eds., 1987) ("The winner-takes-all form of compensation
to research units ... encourages excessive R&D investment and excessive risk-taking on the
part of R&D units competing for the prize."); Mark E Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law
and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 306 (1992) (discussing the costs of patent races);
Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in
1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989) (same); Suzanne Scotchmer, Incentives To Innovate, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 273, 275 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("The litera-
ture has produced two views of patent races: that they inefficiently duplicate costs, and that
they efficiently encourage higher aggregate investment."); Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the
Excessive Allocation of Resources to Research, 14 BELL J. ECON. 152 (1983) (lamenting the
excessive duplication of research); and Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent
Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV.
961, 962 (1996) ("Although a gold rush has its winners, many claims are ultimately unpro-
ductive, and thus many prospectors waste valuable resources and go unrewarded. Gold
rushes are also unproductive in [that] ... [flollow-on prospectors bid resources away from
higher valued uses outside the prospecting industry to lower valued uses inside it'"). Cf
Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175,
2177 (2000) (discussing the strategic disclosure of information by participants in patent
races); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 929-30
(2000) (same). Michael Abramowicz discusses the literature in The Uneasy Case for Patent
Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2007).
242. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 1813, 1869 (1984). Indeed, Yoram Barzel analogizes patent races to tragedies of the
commons because they involve "overuse" of research. Barzel, supra note 241.
243. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18 (2003); Grady & Alexander, supra note 241, at 317;
Vermont, supra note 138, at 491. Suzanne Scotchmer claims that "the firms in the patent race
make zero profit in expectation" because it has all been dissipated by wasteful efforts to win
the race. Suzanne Scotchmer, Ideas and Innovations: Which Should Be Subsidized?, Soc.
ScI. RES. NETWORK (Jan. 11,2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755091.
244. See Kitch, supra note 172, at 269-70.
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And even opponents of that theory are careful to argue that encouraging
later filing in patent cases won't encourage patent races. 45
In fact, though, patent races can have substantial benefits. First, as
John Duffy has observed, the benefit of a race is that people run faster
than they otherwise would.246 As a result, a patent race should both cause
inventions to be made sooner than they otherwise would be and, because
patent terms are measured from the filing date, cause the resulting patents
to expire earlier than they otherwise would. The parties to the race may or
may not dissipate their private rents, but society benefits both from the
earlier invention and from the earlier entry of the invention into the public
domain. And because inventions tend to be cumulative, the earlier inven-
tion date also means that we should get a cascade of improvements earlier
than we otherwise would.
Second, the idea that races involve a wasteful duplication depends on
the assumption that the parties achieve the same end in the same way. But
very often that is not true. Inventors racing to solve a problem quite often
solve the problem in different ways. 47 And when they do, they contribute
something valuable to the world that we would not have obtained from a
single inventor who takes a different approach.248 If the problem is powered
human flight, for example, both airplanes and helicopters are desirable solu-
tions to that problem, even though-indeed, because-they differ in various
respects. The mere existence of two alternatives provides valuable competi-
tion, even if the two are equally good. Further, different approaches will
245. See, e@., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 127-28 (2009).
246. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 444-45 (2004). Duffy refers to his theory as a branch of prospect theory, but in fact it is
not only distinct from but decidedly at odds with prospect theory's hostility to patent races.
247. Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, 11 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG.
139, 140 (1993) (recognizing the possibility of "asymmetric equilibria"); Jennifer F.
Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior, 50
ECONOMETRICA 671, 671 (1982).
248. Merges, Rent Control, supra note 189, at 381. Courts and commentators have
recognized the value of different approaches in another related context: efforts to design
around an existing patent. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 36 (1997) (contrasting "the intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of
legal action" with "the incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to
capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance"); see also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v.
Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around patents is, in
fact, one of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in pro-
moting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent system is
its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when they
are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."); Matthew J.
Conigliaro et at., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2001);
Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-41 (2000)
("The practice of designing-around extant patents creates viable substitutes and advances,




quite often be better in some circumstances than others. Some patients re-
spond better to some drugs than others, even if overall the drugs have an
equivalent therapeutic effect. Some customers prefer one type of cereal to a
nutritionally equivalent alternative. And different inventions can be plat-
forms for different types of subsequent improvement. Indeed, some
valuable inventions have come from unexpected new applications of exist-
ing technology, including the Post-it note and the cardiac pacemaker. And
Aylsworth discovered chemical vapor deposition in the course of trying to
design a lightbulb with a noncarbon filament in an effort to avoid
Edison's patents. The fewer different implementations of an invention we
have, the less likely it is we that will encounter those serendipitous reuses
or entirely new directions. The Post-it note worked because 3M had de-
veloped a specific type of glue, despite the fact that it already had plenty
of other glues; if we didn't have a number of different types of glue, we
probably wouldn't have the Post-it note.
Finally, inventors may work better when they are under some deadline
pressure. The proverb is "necessity is the mother of invention." While pro-
spect theory posits that monopolists will have the right economic incentives
to improve on their products, for the reasons noted above, it is often compe-
tition, not monopoly, that spurs innovators to action.249 So it may not only
be that we get innovation more quickly as a result of competitive pressure,
but that we get better quality ideas as a result. It's hard to know how signifi-
cant a role this plays; the more logical inference from independent invention
is that we would have gotten the new idea anyway.25 ° But it is at least possi-
ble that, but for the spur of competition, none of the racing parties would
ever have gotten to the invention.2 1
249. See Arrow, supra note 184, at 115; see also KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note
184, at 104; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 159, at 660 (criticizing Schumpeter's "less cau-
tious" followers for advocating monopoly to promote innovation); Lemley & Lessig, supra
note 213, at 960-62 (arguing that the internet is as innovative as it is because its architecture
required competition rather than monopoly bottlenecks); Shelanski, supra note 213, at 85
(finding that competition is better correlated with innovation than is monopoly in ten empiri-
cal studies in the telecommunications industry); Aamir Rafique Hashmi, Competition and
Innovation: The Inverted-U Relationship Revisited, Soc. Sci. Res. NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1762388 (finding strong evidence of a positive relationship between
competition and innovation). Indeed, a review of the economic literature indicates that com-
petition even makes monopolists more efficient. Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Jr.,
Competition and Productivity: A Review of Evidence, 2010 ANN. REV. EcoN. 619, 620-21.
250. Vermont, supra note 138, at 478 (suggesting that valuable inventions that are in-
dependently developed likely would have been developed even without a patent incentive).
251. Studies of actual physical races suggest that participants go faster and last
longer when they run in the presence of another competitor, even if they are not explicitly
trying to beat that competitor. Matt Fitzgerald, Why You Shouldn't "Run Your Own Race",
COMPETITOR (Apr. 9, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://running.competitor.com/2011/04/training/
why-you-shouldn%E2%80%99t-%E2%80%9Crun-your-own-race%E2%80%9D_- 2446 3. So
there may be psychological and even physiological reasons why we are hardwired to perform
better when competing against others.
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Patent races, then, may have gotten a bad rap. It is possible that patents
encourage putative inventors to race to achieve a result first, and in doing so
get us a greater variety of inventions more quickly than we would have in
the absence of patent protection.
As a descriptive matter, the evidence suggests that for better or worse
the patent system is about patent racing. And I suggest that racing can
have substantial benefits. But to justify the patent system as a means for
encouraging patent races, more is required. First, we would want evidence
that it is the race for a patent, not just the race for recognition or to be
first, that motivates inventors. As we have seen, at least some of the inven-
tions (the cotton gin and the telephone) were explicitly patent races. But
other races might have occurred even without a patent system, because
there are substantial reputational advantages to being first. Indeed, one
might say that our society is obsessed with races, valorizing the winners of
Olympic events whose times are virtually indistinguishable from the
second-place finishers, and awarding prizes and name recognition to a few
scientists while disregarding the work of others. We might not need the
patent to provoke a race; society itself may provide plenty of incentive.
Next, assuming that the patent is motivating the race, it is worth distin-
guishing between two different aspects of the race that might motivate
participants: the carrot and the stick. The traditional view of the patent system
is as a carrot, a reward dangled in front of the inventor to lure investment in
research. Patent racing changes the nature of the carrot-the promise is not of
a patent as reward for successful invention, but of some chance of a carrot (if
the inventor wins the race) and some chance of nothing (if she doesn't). That
complicates the calculus of patent incentives, as discussed further below, but it
doesn't overthrow the basic story altogether.
Patents in a race can also serve as a stick, however. This approach
adopts and inverts Arrow's competitive innovation paradigm. On this
view, inventors aren't driven by the lure of being a monopolist so much as
by the risk of losing a race and being excluded from competition in that
market. Even inventors who don't care much about winning the patent
and excluding competitors may care very much about being excluded
from the market by others; at a minimum, they want freedom to operate.
The patent isn't a carrot so much as a stick with which to threaten the slow.
Patents themselves might well be undesirable on this theory; we keep them
because the race to get them-and therefore not be excluded from the mar-
ket-has positive effects that outweigh the inefficiencies that result from the
distortion they impose on markets.
Whether we think patent racing is predominantly about carrots or about
sticks matters, because each view has different implications for the structure
of the patent system. A patent racing system is very much concerned with
ex ante incentives. Whether a patent gives control over downstream im-
provements matters only if the racing parties think it matters. If they are
racing in the hope of achieving enduring patents that will provide the broad
ability to exclude others from the market, then that's what patent law should
provide. By contrast, if racing parties have some other expectation-if what
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they are racing for is a patent that they think will give them some sort of
financial security, or a patent that allows them the freedom to operate, rather
than the right to exclude, then that's all patent law need provide. 252 That
concern with incentives may mean that patent law should operate like a lot-
tery, offering not the promise of a small reward but a small chance of a large
payoff. Patentees, like purchasers of a lottery ticket, appear to overvalue the
small chance of a large reward, so we may get more innovation from such a
system.
2 53
But inventors may also be racing to complete the invention in order to
avoid losing out in a patent race. Here, the "incentive" offered by the patent
system is not the promise of a payoff, but the threat of being taxed or even
excluded from the market entirely if they lose the race. The importance of
this stick-as opposed to the normal carrot of the incentive-to-invent
story-represents a significant difference between the two theories. An
incentive-to-invent theory focuses on only one party-the putative ex-
traordinary inventor who does something others cannot. Once we
introduce multiple inventors, the effect of the patent system on invention
becomes some combination of the positive and negative incentives. And
while on the positive side a racer might want strong control over down-
stream improvements, or a probabilistic chance at a huge payoff, a racer
concerned with losing the race would want the opposite.
Until 2011, the reward for winning a patent race was absolute: the first
to invent gets a patent and the loser gets nothing, not even the right to con-
tinue using the product he himself developed.254 This is not a small feature
of the patent system; Chris Cotropia and I have demonstrated that the over-
whelming majority of patent lawsuits are filed not against people who copy
the invention from the patentee, but against independent inventors. 25 5 On an
incentive-to-invent theory, that's a problem, because it suggests that the law
is primarily enforcing patent rights in cases in which there are multiple in-
dependent inventors of the same thing. 256 But if we encourage racing, that's
252. Cf Fromer, Expressive Incentives, supra note 169 (manuscript at 44-46) (arguing
that we should focus on what actually motivates people).
253. See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for
the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142-43 (2008); F.M. Scherer, The Innova-
tion Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
254. Wolfgang Leininger describes the patent system as a sort of "all pay" auction in
which both winners and losers must pay, but only the highest bidder wins. Wolfgang Lein-
inger, Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations: The Dollar Auction Revisited, 33 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 231, 233 (1989).
In September 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. That Act
moved the United States from a first-to-invent to a modified first-to-file system, effective
with patent applications filed in March 2013. It also created a prior user right that applies to
process inventions. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
255. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1459.
256. For arguments regarding various forms of market sharing with simultaneous inven-
tors, see, for example, Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention
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not necessarily a problem. It may even be a virtue. Granting prior user rights
(as the new America Invents Act does) or eliminating injunctions would
reduce somewhat the incentive given to the winner, but it would also reward
those who were a close second in the race. That would reduce the "stick"
incentive to race, since the loser would not have as much to lose." 7 The ef-
fects on the carrot side would be more complex, since they will depend on
whether the individual racers think they are likely to win and on whether
they are risk-averse or risk-preferring (that is, whether they would prefer a
chance at a large payoff to a certainty of a small payoff). Under plausible
assumptions, inventors are both risk takers and overly optimistic.2 -5 If so,
the winner-take-all feature is likely to drive entrants to run the race, both
because they think they are likely to win and because they are willing to
take the risk of losing.
25 9
Notably, a patent racing theory does not depend on the nonobviousness
of the invention or the inability of others in the field to achieve it. Rather,
the argument is that the possibility of obtaining a patent before someone
else spurs inventors to act in ways they otherwise would not, producing
quicker or better or different inventions. Indeed, Ben Roin has suggested
that companies in the pharmaceutical industry may be extremely concerned
with the outcome of races, to such an extent that they will not develop even
new chemical products with substantial market demand unless they can be
sure that they will get the rights to the chemical. 260 Pharmaceutical compa-
nies may, then, be exhibiting an extreme form of racing behavior, calling off
searches if they think they will end up in second place.
Depending on whether one believes that the carrot or the stick
predominates, a patent system designed to encourage patent races might look
rather different from the one we have today. We would pay less-perhaps
even no--attention to the knowledge of others of skill in the art. Simultaneous
invention would not necessarily be evidence against the granting of a patent,
as it sometimes is today.261 Indeed, on a patent racing theory we might be
more likely to grant patents in precisely those circumstances in which we
expect others to be working on the same problem. A patent racing theory
might well support the recent switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file
Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User
Rights, 96 Am. EcoN. REV. (PAPERS & PRocs.) 92 (2006); and Vermont, supra note 138.
257. Economists refer to this as the "competitive threat." John Beath et al., Strategic R
& D Policy, 99 EcON. J. 74, 74 (1989); Vincenzo Denicol6 & Luigi A. Franzoni, On the Win-
ner-Take-All Principle in Innovation Races, 8 J. EUR. ECON. Ass'N 1133, 1143 (2010)
("[One] advantage of the winner-take-all system is that it maximizes the competitive threat
for any given level of the aggregate award .... ").
258. See Crouch, supra note 253, at 141; Scherer, supra note 253, at 15-19.
259. See Denicol6 & Franzoni, supra note 257.
260. Roin, supra note 176, at 545.
261. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1986). For discussion of the role of simultaneous invention in obviousness, see




system, as parties concerned with entering a patent race should have some
way to find out whether they have won. But it might be more skeptical of
prior user rights, especially if they have the effect of substantially diluting
the benefits patentees get by winning a race.
Finally, a patent racing theory, like any other, must contend with the ef-
fects on third parties. Granting strong patent rights isn't costless; it raises the
cost of the products once sold, it may delay commercialization of the inven-
tion, and it may raise the cost of later improvements. 26 2 And encouraging
patent races may have specific social costs. For instance, it may cause secre-
cy rather than openness in the period leading up to the invention, as racers
seek an edge over their rivals. And our historical examples suggest that the
exchange of information is integral to innovation in many cases. So to know
whether patent racing theory justifies patent protection, we need to do the
same sort of balancing as in incentive-to-invent theory. We want to know, in
short, whether the innovation benefits of granting patent rights exceed their
costs.
The risk of losing a patent race represents an ironic justification for ex-
clusivity. We are using the implicit threat of keeping the inventor's product
out of the market as an incentive to hurry an inventor along in inventing and
filing, and the prospect of a monopoly to spur competition. Given the sub-
stantial differences between patent racing theory and existing law, we need
better evidence than we have today about how important racing incentives
are in driving innovation across a range of industries, and at what cost, be-
fore we can conclude that racing theory justifies patent law.
Whether and to what extent racing motivates inventors in the real
world-and whether it is the carrot or the stick that motivates them-is un-
clear and calls out for further research. We might seek evidence to support,
refute, or refine patent racing theory from a variety of sources:
First, we might survey inventors about what motivates their behavior.
Some such surveys are already available, most notably the Berkeley En-
trepreneurship Survey, but they have not focused specifically on patent
racing.263 The literature on optimism bias among inventors 64 seems rel-
evant here, because it would push against a "risk of losing" racing
theory. The literature on intrinsic motivation is also relevant;265 if people
are inventing for the joy of it, and not particularly worried about market
position, patents are more a cost than a benefit. And because most in-
vention today is corporate, not individual, we need to think about the
motivations of companies, which may be more likely to race for market
position than for patent exclusivity.
262. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 158.
263. Stuart J.H. Graham et al,, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009).
264. E.g., Crouch, supra note 253; Scherer, supra note 253.
265. For a survey of that literature, see, for example, Fromer, Expressive Incentives,
supra note 169 and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just
Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 42-54 (2011).
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Second, we might pay more attention to the behavior and motivation of
participants in interference proceedings and priority contests, who we
know ended up in a patent race, intentionally or not.
Third, we should pay careful attention to industry-specific differences in
racing motivations. We know those differences exist for every other pa-
tent theory,"6 and it seems likely that will be true of patent races as
well.
Fourth, we need to think carefully about how a theory of racing inter-
sects with the reality of invention not as a discrete activity, but as a
continuous series of improvements. Even if parties are racing to one
milepost, the race to produce a particular invention is not the end of the
story. For most technologies, if there is a patent race, it is a relay race:
where any participant starts may depend on where others have ended.
Whether racing theory can justify the patent system depends in signifi-
cant part on how racing incentives at one stage create rights that may
affect innovation (and racers) at later stages. That is even truer today,
when inventors seem to file multiple patent applications on small parts
of a large, multicomponent product. It is one thing to view oneself as in
a race to build and patent a working telegraph; it is quite another to
think of "racing" to invent a particular circuit layout that is one small
piece of a vast effort to produce a new microprocessor.
Fifth, we should think about how the patent system impacts the small
but significant category of accidental inventions. Patent law today does
not care how an invention is made;267 it protects accidental as well as de-
liberate inventions. But a racing model is explicitly about deliberate
rather than accidental invention; it may not justify patent protection for
those who invented without intending to do so.
Finally, we need to think about how patents play into the motivations of
all participants, not just those who end up seeking a patent. We know
that in many industries people invent for a variety of reasons that have
little to do with the prospect of financial reward. 268 And some literature
also points to the prevalence of strategic disclosure of information out-
side the patent system by participants in invention races.269 Races may
be won by inventors with no interest in patenting; that fact will affect
racing incentives. Those nonpatenting inventors will benefit from prior
user rights, and that fact might be enough to justify the creation of those
rights even under a racing theory.
There is much to think about here. Patent racing is not (yet) a developed
theory of patent incentives. But as we assess the most important inventions
of the last two centuries, it is certainly a phenomenon that deserves further
266. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 212, ch. 6.
267. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made."). This section was recently amended by section 3(c) of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103). This amendment will go into effect in 2012. See id. § 35.
268. See, e.g., Fromer, Expressive Incentives, supra note 169.
269. See, e.g., Lichtman et al., supra note 241; Parchomovsky, supra note 241.
March 20121
Michigan Law Review
elaboration. For it is more descriptive of the way the world actually works
than any of the theories we have today. Given the historical evidence, if you
are skeptical of the benefits of patent racing, you probably ought to be
skeptical of the benefits of the patent system as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The history of significant innovation in this country is, contrary to popu-
lar myth, a history of incremental improvements generally made by a
number of different inventors at roughly the same time. Our patent system,
by contrast, is designed for a world in which one inventor of extraordinary
skill does something no one else could have done. The resulting disconnect
is a problem not only for patent theory but for the design of the patent sys-
tem, which seems to be based on assumptions about invention that are not
borne out by reality.
If we are to justify the patent system, we need an alternative theory.
Commercialization and disclosure stories-the two alternatives to the incen-
tive-to-invent theory most commonly articulated-don't seem to fit the bill.
The solution may come from a surprising source-a theory of patent
racing that is focused not merely on the positive incentives from inventing
something new, but also on the fear of being beaten by the competition.
Racing theory may or may not be the answer we are looking for; there is
some reason to think that there is no one unified theory that explains all of
patent law. 270 But at a minimum, it provides a partial explanation for how
patents might fit into the innovation puzzle, one based on evidence about
how patents seem to work in the real world. And even a partial explanation
is better than what we have right now.
270. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 212.
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